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RECONSTRUCTING FAULT: THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL
TORTS
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles*

The advent of no-fault divorce is nearly fifty years in the making, and
despite broad intellectual support for the principle of no-fault, fault is
persistently a factor in divorce in many jurisdictions and in the arena
of public and scholarly opinion. Feminists too have been struggling
with this issue for decades, but the controversy persists. This Article
attempts to decode and resolve some of the tension between advocates
of the relevance of fault and those who simply cannot believe that nofault divorce has not ended the fault discussion. This Article focuses
on the plight of caregivers and dependents, which should be the focus
of any divorce regulation, and argues that fault divorce is not
appropriate no matter which side of the sameness/difference debate
one focuses upon. Fault in divorce disproportionately punishes
dependents and does not work hard enough to protect children from
the many potential harms resulting from the dissolution of the
marriage. Instead, spousal torts are the appropriate exclusive domain
for contending with wrongdoing during marriage and the role of
spousal torts should be solidified and clarified so as to provide a clear
outlet for marital wrongdoing. Spousal torts appropriately provide
redress for wrongs between spouses that are recoverable as between
strangers and thereby protect the vulnerable in the domestic sphere.
Moreover, confining litigation of marital wrongs within tort law
provides a narrower and more judiciable means of contending with
serious marital wrongs that appropriately reflects contemporary
norms, protects caregivers and children in need of financial support
and more fairly compensates the victim. The transfer of fault
litigation from divorce to torts, while often criticized as simply
transferring the acrimony from one forum to another, has distinct
theoretical and practical advantages and can preserve what seems
inescapably relevant in fault divorce while benefiting from advantages
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fault in divorce is a curious issue. On the one hand, no-fault divorce
has forcefully revamped the divorce system in all but a very few
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jurisdictions. 1 On the other hand, fault or blameworthy conduct is
persistently relevant, whether as an option in divorce statutes, as a
bargaining mechanism, or to gain advantage in financial and custodial
matters. 2 Despite the broad intellectual acceptance of the advantages of
no-fault divorce for parents and children, there is persistent belief that
wrongdoing that has caused or, at the least was a part of, the breakdown
of the marriage should be relevant in the law of divorce. In that regard,
the divorce process has witnessed the amazing resilience of blame.
Eliminate the bitterness and fighting over the cause of the marital
breakdown from one area of divorce law and the blame and acrimony
pop up elsewhere—property disputes, alimony, or custody. 3 Despite
decades of exploration and contemplation, divorce law and scholars who
study divorce law are still mired in the tension between fault and nofault without a clear resolution. 4
Feminists too have mixed feelings about fault divorce. Although not
originally the product of a deliberately feminist enterprise, no-fault
divorce was endorsed by liberal feminists who applauded the potential
of no-fault divorce to further the goal of gender neutrality. 5 Having to
prove grounds in order to obtain a divorce was traditionally mired with
rigid hierarchical notions of male and female gender roles, and divorce
1. See, e.g., JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 237–38 (2005).
Despite the presence of a no-fault option in all fifty states, fault divorce is still dominant in those
jurisdictions—currently only three states—that only provide for a consensual no-fault option. See infra
Part II.A.
2. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
79, 100–102 (1991); see also infra Part II.A.
3. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 100–102; see generally ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992); Alan H. Frank,
John J. Berman, & Stanley F. Mazur-Hart, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The Nebraska
Experience—An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (1978)
(“Since fighting over who caused the breakup is futile, ‘those who want a fight, now use collateral issues
as the battle ground.’ Fights over custody and support are far more prevalent and are often just as
acrimonious and humiliating as those over grounds, if not more so.” (quoting comment of judge in
Judges’ Questionnaire on Nebraska’s Dissolution of Marriage Law (November 1977) (results on file
with Alan Frank, College of Law, University of Nebraska)); see also Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289–
91 (1975); see, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 cmt. b at 182, § 2.09(2)–(3) (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]
(discussing how adversarial custody disputes can become regarding which parent will be best custodian
and thus recommending a more definitive standard).
4. For recent discussions still struggling with the topic, see Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs
Committed During Marriage: The Child that No Area of the Law Wants, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465
(2009), Harry Krause, On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault Torts to Re-Emerge in the Guise of
Torts, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355, 1362–63 (2003), and Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law,
57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1303 (2008).
5. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1987) (describing in detail the advent of no-fault divorce).
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has too often been awarded in a discriminatory fashion.6 Moreover,
feminists aspiring to formal equality and fighting women’s traditional
dependence on men have supported allowing either party to a marriage
to exit if they so choose without having to prove or contrive the
existence of fault. Such independence and autonomy for women and
men conforms with liberal feminists’ regard for the power of choice. 7
Other feminists, Lenore Weitzman primary among them, 8 are more
sensitive to the effect divorce has had on women’s lives, and argue that
taking grounds out of divorce and assuming women’s equal status at the
time of divorce may undermine women’s bargaining power and sacrifice
their ability to obtain needed financial support. 9 Others look to
6. See Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1110–11
(1989).
7. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1461,
1474 (1992); ROBERT E. BURGER, THE LOVE CONTRACT: HANDBOOK FOR A LIBERATED MARRIAGE
(1973); Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements,
17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 155 (1996).
8. Lenore Weitzman has published the best-known work on the economic consequences of the
new divorce laws for women and children. Her study of no-fault divorce in California found that
“divorced men experience[d] an average 42 percent rise in their standard of living in the first year after
the divorce, while divorced women (and their children) experience[d] a 73 percent decline.” LENORE J.
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN
IN AMERICA 323 (1985). Several scholars have challenged Weitzman’s methodology and her specific
findings. See, e.g., Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of
Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641, 641 (1988); Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic
Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 529–35 (1996). A number of studies, however,
confirm that modern divorce laws have been economically devastating for many women and children.
See, e.g., Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County,
Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 284 chart 6 (1988) (finding that in contested divorce adjudications where
the women were awarded alimony the mean per capita income of the women fell 37% after divorce, the
income of their children fell 61%, and the income of their former husbands increased 55%); Greg J.
Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution,
22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 488 (1985) (reporting that in the first year after divorce or separation “the family
income of women who do not remarry is 70 percent of its previous figure; five years after a divorce or
separation, the ratio for those still unmarried is 71 percent”); Barbara R. Rowe & Jean M. Lown, The
Economics of Divorce and Remarriage for Rural Utah Families, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 301, 324–25 (1990)
(reporting that “the divorced men in this study experienced a 73 percent increase in their standard of
living while divorced women experienced a 32 percent decrease”); Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of
Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 98 tbl.15 (1986) (reporting that, even assuming that all
support orders were paid, women’s mean per capita income after divorce declined by 33%, children’s
declined by 25%, and men’s rose by 120%). Even more modern accounts of the effects of divorce,
agree that there is a disparity between custodial women’s standard of living after marriage and their
spouse’s. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 118 (2003). Others argue that it is not nofault but rules regarding alimony and property distribution that are causing women and children to suffer
after divorce. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing
Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 90–100 (Stephan D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay
eds., 1990).
9. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/5

4

Laufer-Ukeles: RECONSTRUCTING FAULT: THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL TORTS
LAUFER-UKELES FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL TORTS

2/11/2011 3:52:03 PM

211

increased divorce rates and the failure of modern divorce regulations to
fairly compensate women for their time out of the market as the cause of
women’s ills, but still believe that unilateral no-fault divorce increases
divorce rates. 10 Those concerned with the effect of no-fault divorce on
women and children question no-fault divorce—which makes scholars
concerned with the plight of women post-divorce uneasy bedfellows
with social conservatives who long for a return to traditional values that
sanctified life-long marriage regardless of dissatisfaction. Feminists are
just as caught in the puzzle of fault as society at large: on the one hand
they seek equal treatment, and on the other they are trying to protect
women who are suffering under modern divorce laws.
This Article offers a pragmatic 11 resolution to the feminist dilemma
while seeking to relieve tension in the broader “fault conundrum.” 12 It
proposes abandoning fault in divorce, but provides a clear framework in
tort law for litigating physical abuse and extraordinary and outrageous
conduct that causes severe distress between spouses. The transfer of
fault litigation from divorce to torts, while often criticized as simply
transferring the acrimony from one forum to another, 13 has distinct
theoretical and practical advantages, which can preserve what seems
inescapably relevant in fault divorce while benefiting from the
advantages of no-fault divorce.
Despite bargaining power advantages that accrue to some women,
feminists, who are concerned with the effect no-fault divorce has on
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1980); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57
STAN. L. REV. 825, 866–70 (2004) (“The prohibition on interspousal contracts for domestic labor and
the doctrine of necessaries help insure that many married women acquire few separate assets during
marriage, while performing labor that diminishes their future earning potential in the market. In light of
this legal and economic background, divorce laws that assume that spouses have equal bargaining power
in marriage and equal earning power after divorce may frequently be insufficient to keep many divorced
women and their children out of poverty.”); Martha Fineman, Implemeting Equality: Ideology,
Contradiction and Social Change, A Study in Rhetoric and Response in Regulation of the Consequences
of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse with comments by Katherine T.
Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L. J. 2525, 2532
(1994); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don’t Let Divorce off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 14LI.
10. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 2, at 116–19; Thomas Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault
Requirement, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 543 (1989) (no-fault laws “have a significant impact on divorce
rates”).
11. Margaret Radin is the innovator of the concept of the pragmatic feminist. See, e.g., Margaret
Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1699, 1701, 1704–08 (1990).
This Article adopts a perspective in the tradition of Radin’s emphasis on dealing with the realities of
women’s situations and the effect laws have on women’s lives. Radin recommends a context specific
approach to feminist analysis that considers the practical effects of feminist reforms as opposed to a
theoretical construct that can be applied in any situation.
12. The term “divorce conundrum” was coined by Lynn Wardle. See Wardle, supra note 2.
13. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 4, at 1364; Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538–39. See also
infra Part III.C for responses to criticism of spousal torts.
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women and children, should still opt to abandon fault in divorce because
punishing bad behavior in the divorce process disproportionately
punishes child caregivers, who are usually women 14 and whose wellbeing significantly affects the well-being of children. 15 Caregivers in
this context are parents who opt out of market work to some extent—by
not working at all, 16 by working part-time, 17 by selecting a job that only
14. According to the 2008 Census Bureau, Household Data, Annual Averages, Presence at Work
– Full and Part Time Status, mothers of children under six are in the labor force at a rate of 59%, and
mothers with children under eighteen at a rate of 68%. The November 2004 U.S. Bureau of Statistics
Report, American Families and Living Arrangements, indicates that approximately 30% of mothers with
children under eighteen stay out of the workforce full-time to care for children, compared with
approximately 5% of fathers. See U.S. Census Bureau, Families and Living Arrangements,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010); see also
Kemba J. Dunham, Stay-at-Home Dads Fight Stigma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at B1 (“According to
the U.S. Census Bureau’s March 2002 Current Population Survey, among two-parent households, there
were 189,000 children with stay-at-home dads [compared with] 11 million children with stay-at-home
moms . . . .”); Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 19–31 (2000); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a
New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L. J. 2227, 2236 (1994) (“The dominant family ecology has three basic
elements: the gendered structure of wage labor, a gendered sense of the extent to which child care can be
delegated, and gender pressures on men to structure their identities around work.”); BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2003 tbl.4 (2004).
Even after work, research shows that mothers do a lot more caregiving than dads. See ARLIE
HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 6 (1989) (documenting the phenomena of the second-shift wherein working mothers retain
significant domestic labors: “The women [] interviewed seemed to be far more deeply torn between the
demands of work and family than their husbands . . . . They felt the second shift was their issue and most
of their husbands agreed.”).
15. Because ensuring the financial stability of caregivers is in the best interests of the children
for whom caregivers care, by extension the focus on caregivers is directly to the benefit of children. See
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caregiver
Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 47–50 (2008).
16. Although clearly becoming less common, this phenomenon still exists. Only 59% of women
with children under six are in the labor market; 68% of women with children under eighteen are in the
labor market. That still leaves many women who leave the labor market altogether when their children
are young. Men are also leaving the job market to care for children, in increasing, but still marginal
numbers. See Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Married Mothers in the Labor Force: Trends in Labor
Force Participation in Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Feb. 2007, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf. On average, both the husband and wife work in only
54.1% of married couples. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERCENT OF MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILIES WITH
BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE LABOR FORCE: 2008 (2008).
17. Persons are included as employed in labor statistics and part of the labor force even if they
are employed fewer than thirty-five hours per week. According to the 2008 Census Bureau, Household
Data, Annual Averages, Presence at Work – Full and Part Time Status, mothers of children under six
appear to be in the labor force at a rate of 59%—leaving 41% unemployed entirely—although that
number does not account for the subset of women working part-time—less than thirty-five hours—and
thereby sacrifice earning potential to be with children. According to The Bureau of Labor Statistics
released in February 2007, Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants, 60.2%
of women with children under three are in the labor force, 29.4% of those women work part-time.
About 68% of mothers with children under eighteen are in the workforce and 24.3% of those women are
working part-time. Women Leaving and Re-entering the Workforce, EMPLOYMOMS, June, 2009,
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demands forty hours per week or fewer, 18 by working from home, or by
otherwise getting caught in the mommy–track long term or
temporarily—in order to care for their children. Therefore, caregivers
earn a reduced or limited market wage and become wholly or partially
financially dependent on their spouses and attached to the children for
whom they care. 19 Notwithstanding the reality that many female and
male primary caretakers within a marriage have become significant
contributors to family income, for the most part, primary caretakers,
who are usually women, still contribute and work significantly less than
their spouses. 20 The same is logically true for men who take on the role
of primary caretakers. Since considering fault can be used to reduce
needed financial support and can even affect custody, 21 caregivers and
their dependents are disproportionately affected by fault because they
are more sensitive to the loss of support and custody. As a result,
caregivers, who may have acted badly in a moral sense (i.e., by
committing adultery, being incorrigible to their spouses, or being
bullies) but are still good mothers or fathers are disproportionately
subject to punishment in the divorce process.
Caregiving is an essential and undervalued gender role, 22 and the law
http://www.employmoms.com/node/83. See also PEW RES. CTR., FROM 1997–2007: FEWER MOTHERS
PREFER FULL-TIME WORK (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/
WomenWorking.pdf (describing how over the past decade, full-time work outside of the home has lost
its appeal to working moms); DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT:
MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 146–48 (1996) (indicating
that only 28 percent of women with young children work full-time outside of the home, while an
additional 40 percent work from home and/or part-time); Joan Williams, “It’s Snowing Down South”:
How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812,
828 (2002) (“Today, two out of three mothers are employed less than forty hours a week during the key
years of career advancement and eighty-five percent of women become mothers.”); Robert Pear,
Married and Single Parents Spending More Time with Children, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2006, at A1 (documenting an increase in time spent by both parents with children and a decrease in time
spent doing housework, but indicating that women still do twice as much housework and child work
than men, as women average twenty-three hours of paid work per week, thirteen hours of child care and
nineteen hours of house work, whereas men average thirty-seven hours of paid work per week).
18. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 1–9 (2002) (93% of mothers work forty-nine hours per week or less). The U.S.
Census Bureau provides statistics indicating that full-time work is thirty-five hours per week. Many of
the better paying jobs, however, demand many more hours—more than even forty hours per week. See
supra note 17.
19. See infra Part II.C.2; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 2; Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce
Liability Without Fairness: Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 58–59 (1991);
Donald R. Williams, Women’s Part-Time Employment: A Gross Flows Analysis, MONTHLY LABOR
REV., Apr. 1995, at 36 (most married mothers still work primarily part-time).
20. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. Although the focus on caregivers in this Article is gender neutral, it is still a gendered
feminist perspective because caregivers are usually female and because the disadvantaged role that
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must focus on the effects it is having on this vital institution. 23 The
plight of caregivers and the children for whom they care should be the
focus of modern divorce law. 24 Therefore, the goals of divorce law
should not be punishing bad behavior, potentially leaving good
caregivers and their children in financial ruin, but rather should focus on
shepherding families through the process of divorce with as much
financial and emotional stability as possible so that the parties can
separate their lives and work together for the betterment of the children
of the marriage. 25
On the other hand, it is a palpable injustice to ignore certain extreme
wrongdoing between spouses. When wrongdoing is not only “fault” but
physical abuse or extraordinary and outrageous emotional abuse causing
severe distress, the legal system must provide an outlet for adjudicating
caregivers find themselves in has evolved in the context of the gendered nature of that caregiver role.
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURCES ON LIFE AND LAW 73 (1987) (“A few
husbands are like most wives—financially dependent on their spouse. It is also true that a few fathers,
like most mothers are primary parents . . . . My point though is that occupying those particular positions
is consistent with the norms for gender female. To be poor, financially dependent, and a primary parent
constitutes part of what being a woman means. Most of those who are in those circumstances are
women.”); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 179
(2004). This Article focuses on and argues on behalf of the institution of caregiving. Although the
Article points out that woman are usually the caregivers, it does not seek to reinforce outdated
stereotypes, nor does it attempt to encourage or force women, as opposed to men, to undertake
caregiving roles.
23. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 4–6, 32–39; see also Anne Laquer Estin, Maintenance,
Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 787–802 (1993); Laura T. Kessler,
The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of
Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001) (arguing that the importance of
caregiving should be considered in shaping and interpreting the law of employment discrimination);
Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 61 (2002) (“‘We need to elevate care to
this level of importance [a core value] for the basic reason that it is essential to human health and
balanced development.’” (quoting MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW
FAMILY POLITICS 48–49 (1999))); Lucinda Findley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1176 (1986) (“Employers should bear
the costs of [childbearing] responsibilities because childbearing and rearing are crucially important
social functions that are connected to and have major impacts on the work world.”). But see Katherine
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 186–87,
208 (2001) (arguing that children are not, in fact, a public good, but rather a personal choice and that
population can be replenished by immigration). For a poignant critique of Franke’s argument, see
Becker, supra, at 73–75.
24. See infra Part II.B.1.
25. Because this article focuses on the effects of divorce on caregivers and dependents, the
arguments are aimed at married couples with children, and approximately 70% of married couples have
children. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSE AND FAMILY STRUCTURE: HOUSEHOLD TYPE 1999–2000
(2000); infra notes 104–105 and accompanying text. For married couples without children, no-fault
divorce does not carry the great burden of contending with dependency and children which are the
leading indicator of causes of poverty and thus the no-fault dilemma is not pressing. See, e.g., WARREN
& TYAGI, supra note 8, at 6–7. For unmarried couples with children, divorce law does not apply and is
thus beyond the scope of this Article.
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such harms. 26 When such abuse occurs, punishment and even financial
ruin may be warranted, regardless of the caregiving activity of whoever
inflicted the abuse. 27 Despite the end of spousal immunities, such
litigation is still rare for physical abuse and is not widely accepted for
emotional abuse. 28 Moreover, spousal torts are heavily criticized by
scholars for simply transferring the acrimony and creating more
intrusive litigation. 29 Yet, ignoring such abuse in the domestic sphere
discriminates against women, who as a matter of statistics spend more
time in the home and are more vulnerable to abuse in the home.
Moreover, entering the domain of torts establishes a deliberately higher
bar for punishing wrongdoers, thereby preserving financial loss for
extraordinary wrongdoing. Indeed, the notion of “extraordinary and
outrageous conduct” in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress should be used in the marital context to distinguish between bad
behavior that should not cause financial suffering for caregivers and
children in the divorce process and tortious conduct that justifies
significant pecuniary compensation.
This argument against fault in divorce and for legitimizing a role for
spousal torts resolves the tension between feminists concerned with
recognizing and supporting the reality of women’s lives 30 and liberal
feminists looking for gender neutral laws. 31 According to this argument,
no-fault divorce should be preferred from the perspective of gender
neutrality or difference feminism, particularly for cultural feminists
focused on the importance of caregiving. Torts should be available for
spouses in a manner equivalent to their availability for strangers, thereby
satisfying liberal feminists’ quest for equality and relational feminists’
26. The terms “extraordinary and outrageous” behavior and “severe” distress are used in order to
signal the reference to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). See infra Part
III.A.1 for case cites and discussion of this tort.
27. Primary caregivers should be awarded a presumption of custody. However, when serious
physical and emotional abuse has been carried out, even loss of custody to the primary caregiver during
the marriage may be warranted or at least may need to be considered and the custodial presumption
rebutted in the best interests of the children. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 47; see also infra
notes 286–294 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. For a sampling of formal neutrality feminists focused on gender neutral law, see Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949).
31. For a sampling of the perspective of difference feminists, see Mary Becker, Patriarchy and
Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 41–42 (1999); Christine
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1295–300; 1304–08 (1987); CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1993);
Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 87 (1987).
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desire to protect women’s different lives.
In addition, this solution provides a clear, albeit limited outlet for the
harshest feelings between spouses that develop because of physical
abuse and for extraordinary and outrageous emotional abuse. This
should provide satisfaction to those who persist in attributing legal
relevance, at least with regards to financial consequences, to bad
behavior that causes or surrounds divorce. Thus, although fault in
divorce and spousal torts are clearly separate inquiries, this Article links
the two in an essential manner because it points to an alternate and better
outlet for dealing with the harshest behavior between spouses. At the
same time, spousal torts should be separated to the extent possible from
the divorce process so as to preserve divorce for dealing with separating
families as well as providing financial and emotional stability for parents
and children. Torts cannot and should not contend with all, or even
most, of the bitterness that is associated with divorce—such mutual
recrimination is not judiciable, nor does punishing bad behavior in the
courtroom serve the interests of families. 32 However, spousal torts do
provide legal recourse where such recourse would be warranted as
between non-spouses and that much is fundamental to providing a just
and non-discriminatory legal system.
This Article’s argument has two parts. Part II assesses contending
with wrongdoing between spouses in the context of divorce law, and
Part III assesses the alternative of spousal torts. Part II is structured in
three subparts. First, in order to facilitate this assessment of fault in
divorce, subpart A discusses the current role that fault plays in the
divorce process. In particular, it examines unilateral versus consensual
divorce, fault-regarding as opposed to fault-driven and fault-blind
divorce, and the role of complicity in divorce.
Next, subpart B considers the appropriate goals of modern divorce
law in light of contemporary norms in order to assess fault in divorce.
The best justification for divorce regulations in light of the more
individualistic and equal society in which we currently live is the
protection of dependent children and their caregivers as opposed to more
traditional rigid regulations focused on preventing divorce. That subpart
also considers arguments that divorce law should attribute blame as a
reflection of the acrimonious and often blameworthy nature of the
marital breakdown. In actuality, attributing blame to a winner and a
loser in a divorce process does not reflect the mutual blame, regret, and
breakdown of trust that is a regular part of most divorces.
Subpart C then considers the way in which taking fault out of divorce

32. See infra Part III.A.3.
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affects the plight of children and caregivers. This subpart considers the
argument that taking fault out of divorce hurts women because it
undermines the bargaining power needed to obtain vital financial
support. This Article argues, however, that punishing wrongdoers for
their role in causing the breakdown of the marriage disproportionately
affects women in divorce because caregivers have more to lose from
financial and custodial sanctions than market earners, who take their
earning potential with them after divorce. This subpart next considers
whether taking fault out of divorce would hurt children because it eases
the divorce process and harms the sanctity of marriage; therefore,
potentially causing an increase in divorce or a decline in marriage,
which can be harmful to children. This Article concludes that the
evidence does not reliably support these hypotheses.
Part III, which makes the case for tort law as an alternative outlet for
contending with wrongdoing by spouses during marriage, is divided into
three subsections. First, it provides an outline of the modern
jurisprudence of spousal torts. It describes the contemporary legal
recourse available for wrongdoing between spouses in the realm of torts.
It then provides rationales as to why spousal torts are so rarely brought
and are even more rarely successful. In particular, it focuses on the
problems of overlap between fault in divorce and spousal torts as well as
the need to define an exclusive outlet for marital wrongs. Finally, it
reorients marital wrongs in the context of spousal torts, describing harms
for which spouses could recover damages and those for which they
could not.
Second, Part III makes the case for spousal torts by espousing three
significant benefits of spousal torts as the exclusive arena for litigating
marital wrongdoing. It explores the imperative for providing spousal
torts in order to ensure recourse for those who suffer domestic harms
amounting to extraordinary, abusive, or criminal behavior, just as torts
provide such recourse for such harm to all other people. Any alternative
is discriminatory against the interests of women, who are more
vulnerable to domestic abuse. Moreover, transferring the punishment of
wrongdoing between spouses to the torts context modernizes the
litigation of marital wrongs in light of contemporary norms. A narrower
and more heightened realm of judiciable wrongs conforms to modern
perceptions of the appropriate realm of litigation between spouses,
protects caregivers and children unless serious extraordinary
wrongdoing is involved, and more fairly compensates victims of abuse.
Finally, contending with marital wrongs in torts harnesses the gender
neutral power of torts in pursuit of harms most often suffered by women.
The third subsection of Part III addresses four critiques of spousal
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torts: (1) they are too intimate for objective and identification; (2) they
will only increase acrimony between divorcing spouses; (3) they ignore
complex co-dependent participation in abusive behavior by marital
partners; and (4) they are too costly.
II. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF FAULT IN DIVORCE
This Article assesses the role of fault in divorce in three steps. First,
it outlines the role of fault in contemporary divorce law. Next, it
considers the appropriate purposes of divorce law in order to create a
framework for assessing fault in divorce. Finally, it discusses the role of
fault in divorce in light of the proper purposes developed—namely, the
protection of caregivers and children.
A. The Role of Fault in Modern Divorce Law
In order to set the stage for assessing the role of fault in divorce, this
subpart explores contemporary divorce law, focusing on the relevance of
fault. It discusses the advent of unilateral divorce and the distinction
between unilateral and consensual no-fault divorce, and points to distinct
ways of integrating fault in divorce: fault-blind divorce, fault-regarding
divorce and fault-driven divorce. Finally, this subpart analyzes the role
of complicity in the movement from fault-driven to fault-regarding and
fault-blind divorce.
1. No-Fault Divorce Versus Unilateral Divorce
The right to obtain a divorce no longer must be won based on proving
“grounds”—blameworthy behavior of one’s spouse. 33 In all fifty states,
a marriage can be terminated without proving either spouse’s guilt or
innocence. 34 The no-fault divorce revolution surfaced in the United
States when a 1966 California Governor’s Commission issued a
recommendation that the sole grounds for divorce in that state should be
an “irretrievable breakdown” of the marriage or insanity. 35 In 1970 this
33. For a discussion of traditional fault divorce, see Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language:
Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000); Herma Hill Kay, From the
Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States
During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2019 (2000).
34. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Commentary, The Ali Principles: A Farewell to Fault—But
What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 213, 213–16 (2001); see also Linda Elrod & Robert Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law,
33 FAM. L.Q. 865, 911 (2000).
35. Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291,
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recommendation became law in California. 36 The concept of no-fault
divorce then spread eastward, strengthened by its endorsement in the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA). 37 Laws that are referred
to as “no-fault” divorce laws do not always maintain the original
“irretrievable breakdown” language of the California’s law. Rather the
term “no-fault” refers to any grounds for divorce that do not require one
party to find fault with the other in order to obtain a divorce, including
divorce on the basis of separation for a designated amount of time. 38 A
primary goal of no-fault reform was to eliminate the perjury, complicity,
and adversity that were rampant in the fault system for obtaining
divorce. 39 Moreover, the belief was that the reform would better serve
to preserve those marriages that had not “broken down,” while allowing
troubled marriages to dissolve. 40 The original no-fault reformers
envisioned that fact-finding would be necessary to determine whether
the breakdown of the marriage had occurred, and that, absent such a
finding, a divorce would not be granted. 41 If one party were to maintain
that the marriage was not broken and provide evidence of its continued
functionality, this would be evidence towards a finding that the marriage
should not be ended by divorce. 42 Indeed, the drafting of original nofault statutes demonstrates that the lack of spousal agreement to the
breakdown of the marriage would be cause for temporarily or
permanently delaying the divorce. 43
Nonetheless, modern divorce law, with only a few exceptions, 44 has
300 (1987); Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966);
Charles W. Tenney, Jr., Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24 (1967).
36. See Kay, supra note 35, at 291, 291 n.2.
37. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9 U.L.A. 91 (1979).
38. No-fault laws variously focus on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, see, for
example, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(13) (West 2010), incompatibility/insupportability, see, for example,
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (West 2010), or the de facto separation of the parties, see, for example,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (West 2010) (separation for six months) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3(a)
(West 2010) (separation for three years).
39. Kay, supra note 5, at 4. See also Wardle, supra note 2 at 92–94; Evans, supra note 4, at 473;
Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Should We? Could We?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279, 317 (2008);
infra Part II.A.3.
40. Kay, supra note 5, at 5.
41. See generally Wadlington, supra note 36.
42. Kay, supra note 5, at 36.
43. Id. at 36–39.
44. New York, Mississippi, and Tennessee require mutual consent with regard to no-fault
divorces. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2010) (requiring both parties to sign a
separation agreement, resolving all issues between them, including property distribution, custody and
support payments); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2(1) (2009) (a divorce “may be granted on the ground of
irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and wife”); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (2010) (“[T]he parties [must] have made adequate and sufficient provision by
written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the equitable
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gone even further in easing access to divorce. Modern divorce law is
not only no-fault, it is also unilateral. 45 In addition to not having to
prove grounds, either spouse can obtain a divorce without the other’s
consent. While only one state officially allows for unilateral divorce by
statute, 46 the vast majority of other states allow unilateral divorce after
predetermined waiting periods or by finding that the marriage is
irretrievably broken if one party deems it so. 47 Courts are not apt to
probe extensively into the facts of the parties’ relationship to determine
how broken a marriage is if one party expressly wants to terminate the
marriage. 48 This was not an intended consequence of the original nofault reform. 49 In fact, early critics of no-fault divorce forecasted this
slip into unilateral divorce. 50 Yet, unilateral divorce is a fundamental
part of the trend toward easier access to divorce and the modern societal
distaste for keeping a party trapped in an unwanted marriage. It is part
of the modern focus on the benefits of autonomy in family law—as
opposed to the traditional emphasis on obligation, status, structure, and
regulations. 51
Many jurisdictions maintain both fault and no-fault grounds for
divorce. As of November 2004, fourteen states and the District of
Columbia had statutes allowing only for no-fault divorce, while thirtythree states provided a choice. 52 Given that divorce is available
unilaterally without grounds, however, the question remains as to why
married couples would use fault grounds for divorce (other than in the
three states that require mutual consent). 53 There are a few reasons, but
settlement of any property rights between the parties.”).
45. See, e.g., Elayne Carol Berg, Note, Irreconcilable Differences: California Courts Respond to
No Fault Dissolutions, 7 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453 (1974); Niko Matouschek & Imran Rosul, The
Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence, 51 J.L. & ECON. 59, 62 (2008); Garrison,
supra note 39, at 317.
46. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030 (2010).
47. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(J) (West 2011) (providing for divorce “[o]n the
application of either party, when husband and wife have, without interruption for one year, lived
separate and apart without cohabitation”); see Frank, Berman, & Mazur-Hart, supra note 3, at 66–67.
48. See Stephen L. Sass, The Iowa No Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law in Action, 18 S.D. L.
REV. 629, 650 (1973); In re Marriage of Collins, 200 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Iowa 1972); J. Herbie Difonzo
& Ruth Stern, The Winding Road from Form to Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage,
21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1, 21–22 (2008) (marriage is generally over if one spouse says it is).
49. Kay, supra note 5, at 4; REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE
FAMILY (1966).
50. Sass, supra note 48, at 650; Frank, Berman, & Mazur-Hart, supra note 3, at 61–65.
51. See infra Part II.B.1.
52. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin provide only for no-fault divorce. Kay, supra note
5, at 5–6.
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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admittedly none justify the use of grounds in most cases making no-fault
divorces the statistical norm. 54 First, grounds can eliminate delays that
require parties to live separate for a certain amount of time 55 under nofault laws. 56 Second, where there is no settlement, a fault divorce may
provide one party with an advantage in settling the financial incidents of
divorce, although for states that consider fault with regard to property
distribution, or alimony, fault grounds for obtaining the divorce are
usually not a prerequisite for such consideration. 57 A determination of
fault may also make it easier for the innocent spouse to obtain custody. 58
While marital wrongdoing is not usually as directly relevant to custody
disputes as it once was, courts still may consider marital wrongdoing in
discussions of moral character and fitness. 59 Finally, angry spouses

54. Nancy D. Polikoff, Valuing All Families: An Intro to the 2008 Santa Clara Law Review
Symposium, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 741, 743 (2008); Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal
Marriage: Inevitable or Reversible, 41 FAM. L.Q. 491, 508 (2008); Elisabeth S. Scott, Parental
Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1087 (2003).
55. These amounts of time are usually between six months and one year, although in some
jurisdictions it can be a requirement of up to three years.
56. Kyle v. Kyle, 475 S.E.2d 344, 355 (W. Va. 1996); Konefal v. Konefal, 446 S.E.2d 153, 154
(Va. Ct. App. 1994); Rivette v. Rivette, 899 So.2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (grounds for divorce are
present when spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least 180 days prior to the filing
of the divorce, but since there was evidence of reconciliation in the 180 day period divorce could not be
granted on these grounds); Prather v. Prather, 459 N.E.2d 234, 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (grounds for
divorce are established if spouses live separate and apart for the statutorily required period of one year
without cohabitation, even if they had intercourse one time during that year); Scott v. Scott, 586 A.2d
1140, 1142 (Vt. 1990) (in order to obtain a divorce based on the grounds of living separate and apart the
spouses must live separate and apart for the statutorily required six months, but this does not mean that
the couple must live under separate roofs); Caccamise v. Caccamise, 747 A.2d 221, 229 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2000) (A decree of divorce may be based on voluntary separation if the parties voluntarily lived
separate and apart without cohabitation for twelve months prior to filing for divorce, but because the
wife left the husband and the separation was not mutually voluntary the divorce could not be granted on
the grounds of living separate and apart.).
57. See Margaret Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At Fault People, 18 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 325, 326–27 (1998). But see, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 351 S.E.2d 37 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)
(Decree based on one year’s separation reversed because trial court must consider wife’s claim for
divorce based on husband’s desertion, since such grounds may be relevant in determining alimony.).
58. Patel v. Patel, 577 S.E.2d 587, 589 (Ga. 2003) (Upon a finding of fault in granting divorce,
the party not at fault will be awarded custody unless evidence demonstrates that it is in the best interests
of the child to be in the other parent’s custody.); Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 282 (Miss. 2004);
Stonham v. Widiastuti, 79 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Wyo. 2003); Pietrzak v. Schroeder, 759 N.W.2d 734, 744
(S.D. 2009).
59. Bower v. Bower, 758 So.2d 405, 412 (Miss. 2000) (holding that adulterous relationship can
be considered when determining the moral fitness of a parent to raise a child); Anderson v. Anderson,
386 So.2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (adultery can affect custody determinations if the adulterous
relationship has a negative effect on the child); Chastain v. Chastain, 672 S.E.2d 108 (S.C. Ct. App.
2009) (A parent’s morality is considered when it has an effect on the welfare of the child; flagrant
promiscuity is immoral conduct that inevitably affects the child, but in this case, the wife’s affairs did
not rise to the level of flagrant promiscuity.); Brinkley v. Brinkley, 336 S.E.2d 901, 902–03 (Va. Ct.
App. 1985).
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sometimes want the record to reflect their spouse’s wrongdoing merely
as a record of the wrongdoing. 60
In sum, no-fault divorce has made way for an even more permissive
system of unilateral divorce in most states. Unilateral divorce reflects
modern societal focus on autonomy. 61 While fault is an option in
unilateral divorce states, it is redundant in most instances. On the other
hand, when divorce must be consensual fault plays a much larger role in
the divorce process.
2. The Impact of Fault on the Incidents of Divorce
The goals of the California Governor’s Commission were to eliminate
grounds, and to “remove fault from other aspects of marital dissolution:
from the award of spousal support, from the division of property, and
from the child custody determination.” 62 However, as the states have
adopted no-fault grounds, 63 state legislatures have varied in the extent to
which they are willing to modify their existing provisions governing the
relationship between grounds, the financial aspects of divorce, and
issues of custody of marital children. 64 Recently, fault has become
much less prominent as a factor in determining alimony and property
division in many states, but marital misconduct remains relevant in
others. 65 Twenty-five states include marital fault as a factor in alimony
decisions. 66 Thus, even after the no-fault revolution, where fault
considerations influence financial matters, accusations of fault are not
infrequently used as a means of gaining leverage over the other party in
60. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Beyond the Bounds of Decency: Why Fault Matters to
(Some) Wronged Spouses, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 503, 506 (2009).
61. See Elisabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV.
1901, 1944 (2000); infra Part II.B.1.
62. See Kay, supra note 5, at 5 (citing REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION
ON THE FAMILY 1–2 (1966)).
63. Linda Elrod & Robert Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 807
(1997); Ira Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1996).
64. See Kay, supra note 5, at 5–12; Ellman, supra note 63, at 775.
65. According to a survey by the American Law Institute, twenty states decide the financial
consequences of dissolution without regard to marital misconduct; five disregard fault for property
division and, as a practical matter, almost always do so for support; three almost never consider fault in
financial matters although they could do so under their statutes; seven disregard fault for property
division but consider it for spousal support awards; and fifteen states consider misconduct for both
property division and alimony. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 1, topic 2 (2002); see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector,
A Review of the Year in Family Law: Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and
Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. L.Q. 607, 653 (listing twenty-three jurisdictions in which fault is not
considered in alimony cases and thirty where it is relevant).
66. See Linda Rio, Charts, 38 FAM. L.Q. 809, 809 (2005).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/5

16

Laufer-Ukeles: RECONSTRUCTING FAULT: THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL TORTS
LAUFER-UKELES FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL TORTS

2/11/2011 3:52:03 PM

223

terms of rights to marital property and spousal support. All states
determine custody according to the best interests of the child (or in one
state by approximating custody before divorce), 67 and do not use
custody determinations to intentionally punish a spouse found to be at
fault for ending the marriage. 68 Yet, the details of the fault of one parent
can be used in setting a presumption in determining custody or can be
used in determining moral fitness, one factor in determining custodial
rights in the best interests of the child, 69 particularly if the nature of the
fault can be shown to have caused harm to the child. 70
Accordingly, despite the common perception that fault divorce is
largely antiquated, in an important respect, fault is very much relevant.
There are really two different aspects of fault in divorce: (1) whether
fault should limit access to divorce; and (2) whether fault should affect
the incidents to divorce, particularly the financial incidents.71 In a
comprehensive study, Brining and Buckley explain how the use of the
term no-fault divorce to define only access to divorce is too simplistic,
particularly when discussing how no-fault has affected rates of divorce,
as fault affecting the incidents of divorce can also affect rates of
divorce. 72 Based on this distinction between access to divorce and the
effect fault can have on the incidents of divorce, Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse designates three categories of state systems relating to fault:
(1) “fault-blind;” (2) “fault-driven;” and (3) “fault-regarding.” 73 While
67. One state approximates custody before divorce. See W. VA. CODE § 48-1-210 (2010).
68. Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983) (holding that marital fault should
not be used in custody determinations in order to punish the other spouse); Sumrall v. Sumrall, 970
So.2d 254, 257 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (The court found that the primary consideration when determining
custody of a child is the best interest of the child, not marital fault.).
69. See Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 282 (Miss. 2004) (Moral fitness of parents can be
considered as one factor when determining the best interest of the child.); Stonham v. Widiastuti, 79
P.3d 1188, 1193 (Wyo. 2003) (Wyoming Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 requires the court to consider nine
specific factors when determining a child’s best interest including the relative competence and fitness of
each parent.).
70. See Lynn Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody Litigation, 52
CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 81–82 (2002). This is particularly relevant in the case of domestic abuse where
many states will weigh domestic abuse of the mother as a factor, or even as a presumption. See, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN § 61.13(b) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 9:364 (2009); Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on
Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1055–58 (1991); Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against
Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109
(1995). Needless to say, abuse of the child is directly relevant and is not infrequently a per se factor.
See, e.g., Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 826 (N.D. 1995); Krank v. Krank, 541 N.W.2d 714, 716
(N.D. 1996); In re T.M.B., 491 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Neb. 1992); Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 273 (Conn.
1993).
71. See Krause, supra note 4, at 1362–63.
72. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 57.
73. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2532. See also Ellman, supra note 63, at 778–84.
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there are no longer any fault-driven states, all but the approximately
twenty fault blind states are fault regarding when it comes to property
distribution, alimony, or both. 74 The vast majority of states that are
fault-regarding simply treat fault only as one factor in determining
financial incidents of divorce and not as a bar or an eligibility
requirement. 75 With regard to property distribution, most states are
either fault-blind or have adopted limited fault-regarding approaches, in
which only dissipation of income is considered, but a sizable minority,
approximately one quarter, are fault-regarding. 76 Considerations of fault
are more common with regard to alimony, perhaps because of the
historical context of the importance of fault in setting alimony,77 with
about half the states allowing considerations of marital fault, including
economic fault. 78
States also vary as to what they consider marital misconduct. 79 For
instance, financial misconduct is more often considered than other
misconduct. 80 States that consider misconduct other than financial
wrongdoing consider a variety of conduct to constitute fault: adultery—
which is perhaps the most common and traditional 81 —cruelty, insanity,
and desertion, among others. 82 Considerations of fault have been
difficult to remove entirely because people have strong emotional
reactions to feeling wronged and want that reflected in the divorce
process. 83

74. See Ellman, supra note 63, at 778–84 (explaining that there are three possible ways to
consider fault in setting the financial incidents of divorce: it can be an eligibility requirement (must
prove fault in order to receive alimony), it may be a bar (cannot receive alimony if marital wrongdoing
is demonstrated), or it may be a factor affecting in some circumstances the amount of alimony or
property received). North Carolina used to treat misconduct as a bar and as an eligibility requirement,
but no longer does.
75. Id.; Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law
from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 244–45 (2003); Ellman, supra note 63, at 786
n.29.
76. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2534.
77. For a discussion of the historic relationship between alimony and fault, see infra note 299
and accompanying text.
78. See Rio, supra note 66, at 809 chart 1.
79. See further discussion infra Part III.A.3; see also Ellman, supra note 63, at 777.
80. At least forty-one states authorize taking economic misconduct into account in dividing
property at divorce. See Rio, supra note 66, at 813 chart 5; see also Ellman, supra note 63, at 777.
81. See infra notes 241–251 and accompanying text.
82. Impotence and presumption of death are other fault grounds sometimes included in state
laws. See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204–08 (3d ed. 1985);
Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U.
RICH. L. REV 605, 612 (1996) (listing fault grounds and giving a historical overview of their uses).
83. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 4, at 1363.
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3. Complicity and Fraud in Divorce
A substantial motivation for proponents of no-fault divorce was to
avoid de-legitimization of the system of divorce as couples were actively
circumventing the fault system. 84 If both parties wanted a divorce, too
often they contrived to ensure that the relationship warranted the divorce
and collusion was not uncommon. 85
Moreover, even without
agreement, lawyers reported pressure to doctor evidence so that a
divorce could be obtained. 86 The abandonment of fault-driven divorce
has undoubtedly opened the door to people stuck in troubled
relationships to leave the marriage without having to stoop to
disreputable practices. 87 It is safe to assume that fraud has been reduced
by the no-fault system and by allowing unilateral divorce. 88 This seems
a significant benefit to no-fault divorce. This benefit applies to divorce
upon mutual consent and to unilateral divorce where one party was so
desperate to leave the marriage that he or she would engage in
deception. It is conventional wisdom that a return to a fault system of
divorce would encourage perjury once again. 89 The reality is that upon
a return to a fault-driven system of divorce, couples would likely still
divorce at the same rates, but their fraudulent behavior would be to the
detriment of the legal system and to the financial detriment of the spouse
who most wants to exit the marriage, and who therefore may need to
sacrifice money or custody in order to secure complicity.90 As
discussed below, penalizing this spouse, regardless of his or her identity
or circumstances, is not always in the interests of the legal process or
society. 91

84. Morse, Jr., supra note 82, at 612; Herbi DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter
Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1994); Wardle, supra note 2, at 137.
85. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 93.
86. Id. at 93.
87. Id. at 104; Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal
Regulations, 42 FAM. L. Q. 309, 317 (2008).
88. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 104; see also Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the
New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1127–28 (1936) (reporting widespread belief that
legislators, judges, other court personnel, lawyers, parties, and others colluded to concoct evidence in
divorce cases to satisfy the requirements of New York’s fault-based law).
89. LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 285
(1998).
90. As discussed below, although many have assumed that the spouse who wants to exit the
marriage is usually the man, women more and more frequently are the parties who desire to leave the
marriage. Moreover, they are more often abused and thus need to leave the marriage more quickly.
Women also have more to lose from the divorce process as they are usually more financially dependent
on their spouses. See infra Part II.C.2; see also Garrison, supra note 87, at 317–18.
91. See infra Part II.C.2.
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B. The Purpose of Contemporary Divorce Regulations
This subpart explores the proper role of regulation in contemporary
divorce. First, this subpart considers the changing social norms that
have transformed the very nature of marriage and the corresponding
social attitudes toward divorce, advocating divorce regulations that
focus on dependents and their caregivers as opposed to status and
obligation. Next, this subsection examines the challenge made by some
scholars, jurists, and legislators that ignoring wrongdoing leaves
something fundamental out of the divorce process.
1. Changing Nature of Marriage and Divorce
A significant impetus for the move away from fault driven divorce is
changing societal perceptions of the nature and the purpose of marriage
as well as the changing role of women in society. 92 By the 1960s and
1970s, marriage had begun to transform from a social and economic
necessity for integrating women into society and ensuring their
livelihood to a source of personal satisfaction. 93 As women entered the
workforce, obtaining expanded potential for economic independence,
and as their equal status to men solidified, marriage was no longer
critical as a source of social stability and financial sustenance. Marriage
has instead become a tool of fulfillment. 94 While no-fault divorce was
not a product of the women’s movement, certainly many feminists
supported it based on the notion of equality and increased status of
women it reflects. 95 Contemporary individuals search for a marital
partner with whom they can share a “deep emotional and spiritual
connection” and with whom they “can communicate about [their]
deepest feelings.” 96
These high expectations inevitably lead to
disappointment and dissatisfaction. When expectations are not met,
individuals feel a conviction that they should not be forced to remain in
a relationship with someone with whom they do not have a bond of love,

92. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 95.
93. STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 203–04 (1988); PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK:
GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF UPHEAVAL 12 (1997).
94. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 33; John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now,
in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43–60 (1979).
95. Kay, supra note 5, at 2–3.
96. BARBARA DAFOE WITEHEAD & DAVID POENOE, THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE
STATE OF OUR UNIONS: WHO WANTS TO MARRY A SOUL MATE?: NEW SURVEY FINDINGS ON YOUNG
ADULTS’ ATTITUDES ABOUT LOVE AND MARRIAGE 2 (2001).
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regardless of fault. 97 Modern marriage’s focus on personal fulfillment
understandably sets the tone for demanding release when such
fulfillment is not met. 98
The enhanced commitment to personal choice and private ordering in
the law in the past few decades further propels the sense that marriage
should be freely chosen and not used as a mechanism for entrapment. 99
Society has become more of an observer of intact marriages and is
perceived as having less responsibility in ensuring the longevity and
preservation of marriage when even one member of a couple no longer
wishes to remain in the relationship. 100 In light of the modern focus of
marriage and emphasis on individual rights, 101 both the prerequisites to
entering marriage and the requisites to divorce have waned dramatically
over the past several decades. 102 State interests in keeping unloving
couples in a marriage have weakened substantially and fault-driven
divorce litigation centered on the possibility of denying divorce
altogether has lost its cogency. The question that remains is which
rationale for state regulations of marriage and divorce remains
compelling.
While marriage’s transformation to an instrument of personal
fulfillment has signaled a more complex vision of marriage than as the
sole “instrumentality charged with civilization’s most burdensome, timeconsuming but indispensable task, the acculturation of children,” 103 the
latter task is still very much at the heart of marriage. Approximately
72% of marriages result in dependent children. 104 Marriage is still
97. See Scott, supra note 61, at 1944.
98. The effect of law on culture and society, and of culture on law, is a matter of scholarly
debate. For its purposes of this Article assumes a complex transformative mutually coexistent
relationship. See Spaht, supra note 75, at 245; Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children:
Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1559–63 (1998).
99. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family
Law, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 295 (1995); Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of the
American Family, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809–10 (1985); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan,
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 86 (2004) (arguing that “the availability of free exit
through no-fault divorce” is “a bedrock liberal value” that “stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to
engage; it is the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other persons”); Spaht,
supra note 75, at 301–02.
100. Schneider, supra note 99, at 1809.
101. Scott, supra note 61, at 1944.
102. See generally Spaht, supra note 75, at 288–305.
103. See id. at 244–45; see also Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium:
Heterosexual, Same Sex— or Not at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 299 (2000).
104. Census 2000, analyzed by the Social Science Data Analysis Network, reports that
approximately 28% of married couples did not have children. Census Scope, Household and Family
Structure 1990–2000, http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_house.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010)
(reviewing Census 2000). The U.S. Bureau of Statistics issued a Report in November 2004 entitled
“American Families and Living Arrangements” indicating that in 2003, 66% of married men from the
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widely considered the ideal framework in which to provide financial and
emotional stability to children. 105 When children are raised by a married
couple, one spouse usually compromises his potential for market
earnings to some extent in order to care for those children. 106 Those
children and that spouse become dependent to some extent on the
market earner for financial support both during that marriage and, often
for some period of time, after a marriage ends in divorce. 107 Despite the
increasing presence of both spouses in the workplace, 108 mothers are
still primarily responsible for child care and, as a result, sacrifice market
earning potential and must contend with dependency on their spouses
more than fathers. 109 Recognizing the value in raising children and the
valuable service that caregivers provide 110 necessitates protecting
caregivers and the children for whom they care. 111 And, statistics show,
ages of twenty five to fifty-four had children under the age of eighteen and 63% of married women from
the ages of twenty-five to fifty-four had children under the age of eighteen. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Families and Living Arrangements, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2010). Clearly a larger percentage of overall married persons have children as these
percentages do not take into account married couples with children over eighteen. See WILLIAMS, supra
note 18, at 1–9.
105. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 472 (1983) (“The
objectives of a democratic society based on established patterns of marriage and kinship should not be
terribly mysterious . . . . For instance, a stable environment is crucial to the developmental needs of
children . . . .”); see also infra Part II.C.3.
106. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
107. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 5–7; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995); WILLIAMS,
supra note 18, at 64–81.
108. Mothers are undoubtedly increasingly in the work force. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note
17, at 152 (“In 1970, 44% of married women with young children worked during the year and only 10%
worked full-time, year round. By 1990, 68% of married women with young children worked outside the
home and 28% worked full-time, year round. By 1990, most married mothers of young children had
some involvement in market work, although they typically were employed part-time.”). But the fact is
that mothers are not in the work force in the same manner as men: they usually work a modified
schedule—part-time, flex-time, in the home, or they choose professions or jobs that, although full-time,
allow them to be in the home more than a traditional “male” job. Furthermore, it should be noted that
women who work outside the home have fewer children. See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 13–39, 124
(“Prior chapters have contested the accepted wisdom that it used to be ‘a man’s world’ but that ‘men and
women are equal now.’ A more accurate description is that our system has shifted from one where
(middle class) men were breadwinners and (middle-class) women were housewives to one where men
are ideal workers and their wives (or ex-wives) are workers marginalized by caregiving.”); supra notes
13–19 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 23.
111. See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 157 (2000)
(While historically status and public recognition played the preeminent role in marriage, “[i]n the
twentieth century the public framework of marriage would be preeminently economic, preserving the
husband’s role as primary provider and the wife as his dependent—despite the growing presence of
women in the labor force.”).
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dependents suffer from divorce. 112 Thus, the primary regulatory role for
the state in marriage and divorce has shifted—and should continue to
shift—from regulating entrance into marriage and preserving the
continuity of the marital status toward protecting caregiving,
dependency, and the welfare of children. 113 Family law should create a
supportive environment for rearing children, and upon the dissolution of
a marriage, should protect the children and their caregivers who have the
most to lose from the divorce.
2. The Persistent Belief in the Relevance of Fault
Even in a divorce that reflects contemporary norms, however, a
persistent belief that marital wrongs deserve to be punished remains. As
Harry Krause asked:
are not the risks of marriage increased and is marriage not diminished as a
legal status, and as an economic good, if “good” or “bad” behavior does
not matter? Is it not intuitive—at least to the general public—that “fault”
and “merit” are relevant to achieving “fairness”? Fault and merit are
relevant in all other areas of the law, so why are they not relevant to the
fair distribution of the financial burdens (and benefits) of divorce? 114

Individuals may suffer significant harms in the emotionally charged
breakdown of marital relations, which makes it difficult to accept the
irrelevance of such harms in divorce. 115 Arguably, fault, the part of
divorce that allowed the parties to air grievances about the behavior that
caused the breakdown of the marriage, provided an appropriate outlet. It
has been posited that the narrative and experience of wrongs suffered is
so central to those undergoing divorce that ignoring them fails to capture
the very nature of the divorce process. 116 Simply put, fault matters to
people, so why should it not matter in the law?
The question remains as to whether the judicial process should reflect
the reality of the emotional nature of divorce. 117 Reflecting this reality
in the law needs to be justified, not assumed. Given the hostility and
moral blame as between many divorcing couples, one should inquire
112. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
113. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 36–65; see also Krause, supra note 4, at 1361–62.
114. Krause, supra note 4, at 1363.
115. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2525, 2531; see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 108
(“Apparently, feelings of anger and blame are still a very real dimension of the breakup of modern
marriage.”).
116. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 60, at 504–06; Wardle, supra note 2, at 101.
117. Cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Rights and Realities, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 39 (2008)
(commenting on the debatable proposition of basing family law on the reality of family life where
family life is affected by the law and can be amorphous).
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into how the law is affecting the divorce process and whether it is
creating a process that works. Society supports the rights of people in
failed marriages to exit those marriages without being forced to remain
married. Yet, marriage is still an emotional, love-based commitment
entered into in the hope, if not the expectation that it will last for
eternity. 118 In that way, marital commitments are unique. 119 Allowing
relatively quick, unilateral, and guiltless separation without any
consequences for wrongdoing can actually increase frustration, hostility,
and tension during the divorce process and thereafter. 120 Accordingly, it
has been argued that perhaps fault divorce would create a more lasting
and stable resolution of spousal disputes allowing the parties to move on
and feel vindicated. 121
Despite its logic, this argument should be rejected. Giving an
expressive outlet to the anger involved in the breakdown of marriages
within the judicial process of divorce is inappropriate for dealing with
the typical reciprocal misunderstandings, blame, alienation, anger, and
guilt that occur between spouses during most marriages that result in
divorce. 122 Except in instances of extreme and abusive behavior,123
where the tort system should provide monetary recourse, 124 such mutual
blame and general breakdown cannot be fairly reflected through faultdriven or fault-regarding divorce where a guilty and innocent party must
be identified resulting in one party being punished and the other
vindicated. 125 Moreover, the mutual culpability, blame, and resentment
that often results in divorce is inappropriate for objective identification
as the “cause of divorce,” which can be elusive. 126 Such mutual fault
and recrimination was not part of the original concept of fault divorce,
when divorce was intended to be awarded much less frequently than it
118. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 122.
119. Lynne Marie Kohn & Karen M. Groen, Cohabitation and the Future of Marriage, 17
REGENT U. L. REV. 261, 272 (2005) (citing LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR
MARRIAGE 36–46 (2000)).
120. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 99–103, 199–220, 129–30 (“Modern no-fault divorce laws fail
to balance marriage stability goals with divorce facilitation policy, portray a defective model of marriage
and inadequately provide for the public consequences of private choices.”).
121. See Krause, supra note 4, at 1362–64; Wilson, supra note 60, at 506–07; Woodhouse, supra
note 9, at 2546–47.
122. Huntington, supra note 4, at 1303 (commending the end of fault divorce because fault
divorce failed to contend with the complex realities of human emotion which involve love and hate but
also guilt and reparation).
123. See infra Part III.A.3.
124. See infra Part III.B.1.
125. See Huntington, supra note 4, at 1296 (arguing that the divorce process should be focus on
“repair” and in that process should contend with mutual blame, guilt, anger, and love).
126. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 50–51, 66–67 (discussing how most minor marital
wrongs can not be easily pegged as the “cause” of divorce); Ellman, supra note 63, at 788–89.
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currently is and mutuality or recrimination was a defense to divorce. 127
While family law cannot be the same as family counseling, it should
lean on processes like mediation and collaborative family law in order to
facilitate working relationships among family members beyond
divorce. 128 Families are still families after divorce when children are
involved. Because children are central to why we still need regulatory,
protective family law, as opposed to private contracts and psychological
counselors, 129 the divorce process should not focus on assigning blame
in a one-time fashion, whether through fault-driven or fault-regarding
divorce, but should be part of a process of healing that can recreate a
family support system for children in two households.
C. Evaluating the Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Dependent Children
and Their Caregivers
Previous parts of this Article have defended the proposition that the
focus of divorce law should be protecting and supporting dependents,
and that despite the acrimony inherent in marital breakdown, fault in
divorce cannot properly reflect such feelings. This Part considers in
greater depth how taking fault out of divorce will affect dependents and
their caregivers. First, it provides a brief introduction and historical
perspective on the purpose and nature of no-fault divorce. Second, it
analyzes arguments that eliminating the role of fault from divorce hurts
women and children by eliminating needed leverage in bargaining for
financial incidents of divorce. In countering that argument, this Part
argues that since both men and women are equally likely to want to exit
marriage, but that the financial punishments usually linked to fault
divorce have a greater impact on women, fault divorce has a
disproportionate, harmful effect on caregivers and dependents.
Finally, this Part considers arguments against the abandonment of
fault-driven divorce or divorce by consent because no-fault divorce has
caused an increase in divorce rates and has punctured the stability of
marriage. Those arguments continue by arguing that because divorce
hurts children, no-fault unilateral divorce goes against the interests of
127. A common defense to proving fault grounds for divorce was recrimination—if the accusing
party was also guilty of some wrongdoing, the divorce would not be allowed. See, e.g., J. Herbie
Difonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 53 (1997); see generally, Spaht, supra note 75.
128. See Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363 (2009); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 322–23 (2004); Nancy Ver Steegh, Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting
Values and Expectations Transform the Divorce Process, 42 FAM. L.Q. 659 (2008).
129. See supra Part II.B.1.
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children. This Part critiques these arguments on two levels. First, while
it is clear that children benefit from a stable two-parent home, evidence
does not support the proposition that keeping parents in an unwanted
marriages will always be in the best interests of the children of the
marriage. Second, the correlation between no-fault divorce and the
divorce rate is too complex to be reliable, and marriage is still a thriving
institution.
1. The Purpose of No-Fault Divorce
If marriage regulations are to focus on dependents and their
caregivers as opposed to disputes between spouses or attempts to
entrench spouses within marriages, it seems logical that divorce laws
should aim to smooth potentially harsh effects on children and ensure
that parents are able to work together after divorce. As Herma Hill Kay
noted, no-fault divorce was devised as a method of decreasing hostility
between divorcing couples and ensuring that resolution of disputes
received the proper support in family courts with specialized judges. 130
The need to prove grounds and to counter harsh defenses created
financial and emotional turmoil. 131 This acrimony could not have
served children’s interest in the divorce process. 132 Although the
California Commission’s ideal of eliminating fault-driven as well as
fault-regarding divorce did not become reality, the dissolution of
marriage has been veering toward a more collaborative system for
divorce. 133 No-fault divorce does eliminate the necessity for a focus on
blame in obtaining a divorce: even if the system has been less supportive
than originally envisioned, blame is still part of the process in many
instances.
A divorce process focused on addressing the needs of the parties and
their children, as well as settling financial and custodial issues postdivorce in a manner that focuses on the interests of children and
caregivers, would only seem to be frustrated by contending with blame
and fault, whether in a fault-driven or fault-regarding system. 134
Accordingly, the “forward-looking” 135 American Law Institute’s
130. See Kay, supra note 5, at 4–5; see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 92.
131. Wardle, supra note 2, at 92.
132. Id.
133. See Huntington, supra note 4, at 1287.
134. See, e.g., Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973) (stating that the purpose of nofault divorce is to help families get on with their lives without getting bogged down in blame and the
corresponding harm that results to children).
135. Unable to make a model law out of such disparate state systems, the ALI sets out to make
proactive recommendations while capturing the best of what has already taken hold in state systems.
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Principles of Family Dissolution (ALI Principles) make the case that
divorce should focus on post-divorce living standards and ensuring
adequate financial resources and should not relate to blame at all. 136
This is particularly so in a divorce process that reflects modern
sentiment that it is not worthwhile to keep spouses married, when even
one of the spouses desires to leave the marriage. Both fault-driven and
fault-regarding divorce does not seem to serve the goals of a divorce
process intended to deal with dependents and dependency. 137
2. The Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Women’s Bargaining Power
Feminists have been critical of no-fault divorce for its effects on
dependents and their caregivers. 138 In particular, Lenore Weitzman, in
her influential sociological study, argued that no-fault divorce had
harmed women by tipping the bargaining power to men. 139 While the
degree of disparity she represented is contested, it is undisputed that
women are worse off after divorce than men. 140 Because of women’s
greater level of caregiving activities during marriage 141 and because of
men’s greater market work participation resulting in higher earning
power, women suffer financially more than men at the time of divorce
and need more financial adjustments through property distribution and
alimony. 142 Such caregiving activities may cause financial instability
post-divorce whether undertaken by men or women. 143
When
caregivers suffer financially, the well-being of the children for whom

See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02; see also James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75
IND. L.J. 875, 923 (2000).
136. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 44–53.
137. This does not mean that considerations of abusive behavior—particularly when aimed at
children—should not be relevant in determining who should have primary physical custody. This is
crucial for the well-being of children and should be included in a best interests analysis. See supra notes
58–59, 67–70 and accompanying text. Primary physical custody, however, should be presumed to go to
the primary caretaker absent such clear showings of abuse. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 47.
Yet, consideration of abusive behavior during a custody determination is different than awarding
custody to the “innocent” party as opposed to the guilty party against whom a divorce is issued in the
manner of traditional fault divorce law. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 33; Danaya C. Wright, “Well
Behaved Women Don’t Make History”: Rethinking English Family, Law, and History, 19 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 211, 313 (2004); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children:
The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111 (1999).
138. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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they care suffers as well. 144 Based on her study, Weitzman claims that
no-fault divorce contributed to the relative poverty of divorced women
because not needing to prove grounds for divorce or obtain a consensual
divorce gave women less control in determining the financial incidents
of divorce. 145 Weitzman argues that grounds for divorce helped women
by giving them extra bargaining power at the time of divorce to extract
from their spouses much needed financial support. 146
In other words, the fear is that no-fault divorce allows a man to take
advantage of his wife’s caretaking services during marriage and then
walk away from a virtuous wife over her objections leaving his wife to
suffer for her choices during marriage. 147 Although equitable property
division rules that consider homemaking services often lead to equal
division of property at divorce, this does not contend with the difference
in future earning capacity. 148 Alimony is unpredictable and rarely
awarded. 149 This is particularly problematic when there is little property
to divide, which is usually the case. 150 Moreover, given that the vast
majority of divorces are settled by agreement, the bargaining power
realities are often much more prescient than judge-made law 151 —
although such laws when more determinate have a clear impact on the
settlement process. 152
It should be noted that empirical data confirming such claims is
inconclusive. 153 There is some anecdotal evidence from states like New
York that fault-driven or consensual divorce can help women bargaining
for better financial settlements. 154 Others, including the American Law
Institute, have argued that it is not no-fault or unilateral divorce that is
144. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
145. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 25–27, 323–29.
146. Id. at 25–27, 323–29. See also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 869 (1994); ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT
WRONG 79–80 (1992).
147. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 105 (1987)
(referring to no-fault divorce as “no-responsibility” divorce).
148. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 60–65 (discussing need for caretaker alimony to deal
with this discrepancy).
149. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 329 (3d
ed. 2006); Katherine C. Daniels et al., Alternative Formulas for Distributing Parental Incomes at
Divorce, 27 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 4, 6 (2006) (collecting studies and noting that spousal support is
only awarded in ten to fifteen percent of cases).
150. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 146, at 877–78; WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 1186–88.
151. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979).
152. Id. at 954–57.
153. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 9, at 195; Katerhine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 835 (1998).
154. Garrison, supra note 8, at 90–100.
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the source of the problem, but the lack of legislation intended to
preserve the financial stability of women after divorce. 155 More direct
legislation providing for caregiver support and the primary caregiver
presumption would be more directly effective in curing imbalances in
determining divorce settlements. 156 If the focus of divorce legislation is
on dependents and their caregivers, ensuring sufficient financial support
to those caregivers would arguably be the most effective measure to
take.
Moreover, the feminist argument that rejects no-fault divorce because
it deprives women of bargaining power with regard to the financial
incidents of divorce fails to recognize the modern reality that women,
and by extension primary caregivers, are increasingly the parties who
are at fault or who initiate the divorce. 157 No longer tied to marital
status for social legitimacy, unhappy women are leaving marriages
nearly as often as men. Weitzman acknowledges that caregivers only
receive alimony under fault divorce when they are innocent, but assumes
that they usually are. 158 Yet, women are at fault or instigate divorce
proceedings in modern times at an increasing rate. Recent studies
suggest that women are equally likely to commit adultery as men are. 159
Accordingly, given their increasing lack of innocence and desire to leave
marriages, women suffer from the same need to bargain as men.
Hence, the bargaining power argument, while it may help women in
individual instances, increasingly weakens women’s strategic advantage
in bargaining for needed financial support. 160 As discussed above, faultdriven divorce is also fault-regarding; traditionally, grounds determine
not only the granting of a divorce but whichever party was able to prove

155. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers
Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 216, 229–30 (1997);
see also Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 636 (1991) (suggesting that her
research on the effects of divorce in New York demonstrates not a lack of women’s bargaining power at
divorce, but a lack of rules that provide sufficient spousal support).
156. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 46–47.
157. See Sanford L. Braver, Marnie Whitley, & Christine Ng, Who Divorced Whom?
Methodological and Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993); Margaret F. Brinig &
Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000).
158. See WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 13; see also Singer, supra note 6, at 1110.
159. Benedict Carey & Tara Parker-Pope, Marriage Stands Up for Itself, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2009, at ST1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/fashion/28marriage.html.
160. See Marygold S. Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women
and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759, 770–71 (1986) (Weitzman’s bargaining power
argument assumes that most people who want to exit marriages are men, which is not always the case
and thus fault divorce does not hurt all women.).
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grounds also enjoyed a bundle of financial and custodial rewards. 161
The extent of a spouse’s guilt is still a factor in many jurisdictions when
fault is relevant in setting the alimony, determining property
distribution, or determining custody. 162 Primary caregivers, who are
usually women, have much more to lose in such bargains, and thus, the
lack of power hurts them more than it does men. Primary caregivers
have become attached to those children and are wholly or partially
financially dependent on their husbands. 163 Therefore, the primary
caregiver stands to lose disproportionately from the condemnation of
“improper” behavior through reduced financial support because she is
more in need of such support. 164 Moreover, primary caregivers are more
attached to the children for whom they care and more vulnerable to the
severing of ties with the marital children if fault affects custody
determinations. 165 After divorce, primary earners retain their jobs
161. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 585 (1968) (“The best illustration
of this is also the commonest case, where the divorce is granted for the wife’s adultery. Some courts
have been unduly rigid in refusing to give the wife custody where it appeared quite clearly that the child
would be better of in her care.”); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 33–35 (1988); Singer, supra note 7, at 1461 (1992); Lynn A.
Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 25–52 (1990).
162. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Kay, supra note 5, at 6 (citing ROBERT LEVY, UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS V, B-1 to B-18 (1969)); Grosskopf
v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984); Williams v. Williams, 415 S.E.2d 252 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
163. See Spaht, supra note 75, at 295–96; see also supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
164. The traditional and outdated grounds system of divorce essentially reflects a system in which
property belongs to men and it is for women to lose. Women are to be protected and coveted when
good, but punished when bad. Under early English common law principles, adopted in the U.S., in all
but eight states that have adopted community property rules, husband and wife were considered one
legal entity, but the husband was the “one” who enjoyed control and ownership rights over the marital
assets. Later, under constructive trust principles, and under the Married Women’s Property Acts, the
economic inequality was partially alleviated. But upon divorce, there was still a rebuttable presumption
in most states that the wage earner—traditionally the husband—owned most of the property acquired
during the marriage. Not until 1970 did the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States
Laws draft the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which, borrowing from community property
precedent, instituted a classification for property division on divorce based upon marital separate
property. Thus, the backdrop for fault rules in marriage is clear: the background was that men owned
the property and that at most the woman was entitled to some support upon divorce, and that support
could be lost as a result of her bad behavior. See Sally F. Golfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for
Permanent Alimony, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE (1988), reprinted in 27
J. FAM. L. 351 (1989). Harriet Martineau, an English sociologist who visited the United States in the
1840’s describes the position of women and the problem of domesticity as such: “Indulgence is given
her as a substitute for justice.” 3 HARRIET MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN AMERICA 106, 296 (1837). Despite
their elevation (in marriage), society respected and protected women only insofar as they complied with
an exacting ideal of virtuous and submissive womanhood. The glorification of domestic femininity was
tightly bound to a correspondingly harsh condemnation of those women who strayed outside the bonds
of patronage and dependence. See id. See also infra notes 284–292 and accompanying text describing
why torts provides a more just financial recourse for abusive behavior.
165. See, e.g., Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814; Robinson v. Robinson, 444 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1982);
Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So.2d 5 (La. 1986); Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
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making them less dependent on alimony or property distributed. They
are more accustomed to seeing their children for limited periods of time
as market work keeps them away from home. This might cause more
dependent women to remain in marriages that they would otherwise
want to exit, but this is a questionable objective that is out of sync with
contemporary social mores. 166 Indeed, fault divorce disproportionately
punishes the very caregivers and children whose welfare divorce
regulation should be focused on protecting.
3. The Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Children
Scholars have voiced serious concern over the ease of unilateral nofault divorce in light of the potential harms of divorce on children. 167
Several commentators have argued that allowing “easy divorce” in the
no-fault system does not adequately incentivize parents to work out their
problems and remain in the marriage. 168 If no-fault divorce leads to
more divorce and divorce hurts children, then perhaps no-fault divorce
does not further the goals adopted herein of protecting and supporting
dependents and their caregivers. 169 Scholars and legislators have
therefore proposed a two-tier divorce system, making it harder for
couples with children to divorce. 170 William Galston has even proposed
eliminating unilateral no-fault divorce for marriages with minor
children. 171
Yet, studies on the effect of divorce on children are mixed making it

Francis v. Francis, 823 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Endy v. Endy, 603 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992); see also Norma Lichtenstein, Marital Misconduct and the Allocation of Financial Resources at
Divorce: A Farewell to Fault, 54 UMKC L. REV. 1, 8 (1985); Donald Schiller, Fault Undercuts Equity,
10 FAM. ADVOCATE 10 (1987); Ellman, supra note 63, at 807–08.
166. See supra Part II.B.1.
167. See generally Difonzo, supra note 135; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 10–20, 129–204 (1989);
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Paul C. Bitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of
Parental Separation on Children, 17 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1983); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 29 (1990).
168. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 147, at 106–08 (1987); GLENN T. STANTON, WHY
MARRIAGE MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POST-MODERN SOCIETY (1997); Spaht,
supra note 98, at 1552–59; Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J.
1435, 1438–41 (1998).
169. See supra Part II.B.1.
170. Michigan State Representative Jessie F. Dalman introduced such a bill in 1996. See Kay,
supra note 33; see also Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to
Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607 (1997).
171. William Galston, Braking Divorce for the Sake of Children, AM. ENTERPRISE, May–June
1996, at 36; William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12, 22–23.
See also Difonzo, supra note 135, at 928.
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difficult to articulate sweeping generalizations. 172 While it is clear that
studies demonstrate that children of intact marriages benefit from their
stable family structure, 173 and that children suffer financially and
emotionally from divorce as compared to that previous intact family
structure, 174 it is unclear whether children of divorce or single-parent
households would be better off with their parents married or in twoparent homes. Modern, intact families are most usually coupled by
parents who desire to be together, not those in broken marriages staying
together by sheer dictate. It is unclear what family life would be like for
children with parents who would prefer not to be married, but rather
divorced. 175 Practically, preventing divorce by making it fault-driven or
simply prohibited cannot recreate loving stable families, however
beneficial to children such families are.
On the other hand, studies have more directly concluded that two
issues have serious effects on children’s well-being: (1) the level of
conflict to which children are exposed; and (2) the amount of child
support actually received and financially stability experienced. 176 In
172. See ROBERT EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT 1 (1999);
Yongmin Sun, Family Environment and Adolescents’ Well-Being Before and After Parents’ Marital
Disruption: A Longitudinal Analysis, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 697 (2001); Donna Ruane Morrison &
Mary Jo Coiro, Parental Conflict and Marital Disruption: Do Children Benefit When High-Conflict
Marriages are Dissolved?, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 626, 636 (1999) (finding, based on a study of 727
children between the ages of four and nine in 1988 who lived in intact families to determine the relation
between parents’ marital conflict and childrens’ level of behavior problems in 1994, that “frequent
marital conflict has a deleterious effect on children, possibly even exceeding the adverse effects of
physical separation or divorce”).
173. See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan et al., The Child Abuse Crises: The Disintegration of Marriage,
Family, and the American Community, BACKGROUNDER (1997); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY
SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE-PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); GLENN T.
STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY
10 (1997); David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, The Impact of Divorce on Children: An Assessment of
Recent Evidence, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 619, 622 (1988).
174. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
175. But see AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 93, at 238 (concluding that studies show that parents
staying in unhappy marriages would benefit children). Yet, since unhappy people generally do not stay
together, it is impossible to actually study what such families would be like.
176. See Paul. R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children: A
Meta-Analysis, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 43 (1991) (“Meta-analysis supports the notion that the impact
of father absence appears to be mediated by family conflict; father absence in itself may not affect
children’s well-being. The family conflict perspective was strongly confirmed by the data. This
perspective holds that children in intact families with high levels of conflict should have the same wellbeing problems as children of divorce, and the data supported this hypothesis.”); DANIEL G. SAUNDERS,
NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DECISIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: LEGAL TRENDS, RISK FACTORS, AND SAFETY CONCERNS
(Revised 2007) (“Enthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was fueled by studies of couples who
were highly motivated to ‘make it work.’ This enthusiasm has waned in recent years, in part because of
social science findings. . . . [For example,] Johnston concluded from her [most recent] review of
research that ‘highly conflictual parents’ (not necessarily violent) had a poor prognosis for becoming
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theory, such benefits might be gained either inside or outside of
marriage. In particular, studies have shown that in the context of high
conflict marriages, children of divorce have been better off than children
of parents who have remained in marriage. 177 While the tension and
instability occasioned by divorce undoubtedly harm children, 178 so does
living inside an unloving, potentially abusive relationship mired by
conflict. Clearly, quantifying which is worse in each situation is
difficult. Similarly, it is not possible to ascertain with any clarity which
marriages are better left intact for the sake of children and which are
better dissolved. Marriages are fluid as are their effects on children. It
is clear that financial stability, low conflict, and supportive
environments are extremely beneficial to children. Thus, in order to
maximize children’s interests, the goal of divorce law should be
providing a low-conflict process for divorce and ensuring sufficient
financial support post-marriage through direct legislation.
The argument that no-fault unilateral divorce hurts children assumes
that no-fault divorce leads to more divorce and thereby strikes at the
stability of the marriage relationship. However, it is not clear that nofault divorce actually increases divorce rates. It is not contested that
divorce rates almost doubled between 1969 and 1985, during which time
every state liberalized their divorce laws, making unilateral no-fault the
divorce the reality for most. 179 Logically, it should not be surprising
that easing access to divorce would increase the number of divorces—
no-fault unilateral divorce is less costly and does not have preventative
eligibility requirements. Brining and Buckley argue that under an
expanded notion of fault, allowing for consideration of fault regarding
states, an empirical analysis does demonstrate increased divorce in pure
no-fault states relative to fault-regarding states. 180
On the other hand, many scholars have contested this correlation. In a
convincing law and economic analysis, Elizabeth Peters argued that,
cooperative parents,” and “[t]here is increasing evidence, however, that children of divorce have more
problems because of the conflict between the parents before the divorce and not because of the divorce
itself . . . .” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)); E. Mavis Hetherington, Should We Stay
Together for the Sake of the Children, in COPING WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING AND
REMARRIAGE: A RISK AND RESILIENCY PERSPECTIVE 93–116 (1999).
177. See Paul R. Amato et al., Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-Being
During Early Adulthood, 73 SOC. FORCES 895 (1995); Susan Jekielek, Parental Conflict, Marital
Disruption and Children’s Emotional Well-Being, 76 SOC. FORCES 905 (1998).
178. See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.
179. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 57, at 325–26; ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 20–25 (1992).
180. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 57, at 326–27; see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 116–19
(“[I]t is apparent that the significant rise in the divorce rate in the United States did not begin until the
no-fault divorce reform movement was well-underway.”).
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because of Coasian bargaining, divorce levels should not be affected by
the legal regime. 181 She argues that the economics of divorce should
change and provides data supporting her argument. 182 To that end,
Marsha Garrison pointed out that divorce rates in mutual consent states,
where fault grounds are more commonly used, are not lower than in nofault states. 183 Other scholars simply point to the continuing increase in
divorce rates over the second half of the twentieth century, beginning
from before the time of the liberalization of divorce laws, and point out
that causation cannot be inferred from correlation. 184 Finally, many
have opined that both no-fault laws and the increasing divorce rate were
caused by the same sociological factors that developed around midcentury. The most important of these factors is women’s increasing
presence in the work force. 185 In particular, as discussed above,
changing social mores regarding marriage have certainly affected
modern views of divorce and have made divorce more acceptable and
common. 186 Divorce laws likely do not cause a change in society, but
rather the laws and change in society reflect reciprocal influence more
generally. 187 This complex relationship between social norms and the
law is much more reflective of reality than the alternative of direct
causation in either direction. 188
Furthermore, more recently, the rates of divorce have stabilized and
even declined. 189 A recent New York Times article reported a
conglomeration of studies indicating that ten year divorce rates among
college-educated men married in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s is

181. See Elizabeth H. Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private
Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986).
182. Id.
183. See Garrison, supra note 87, at 316–17.
184. See, e.g., Maire Ni Bhrolchain, “Divorce Effects” and Causality in the Social Sciences, 17
EUROPEAN SOC. REV. 33, 44–53 (2001); V.R. MCKIN & S.P. TURNER, CAUSALITY IN CRISIS?:
STATISTICAL METHODS AND THE SEARCH FOR CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1997);
see also Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws and
Divorce Rates, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 341 (1998).
185. See CHERLIN, supra note 179, at 51; JACOB, supra note 161, at 17–18 (1988).
186. See supra Part II.A.1.
187. Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991
(1989) (“Law is a . . . thing that is shaped by culture, and in turn shapes the culture.”). Due to the
problem of complicity, fault-driven divorce may not even prevent divorces in light of social mores
driving up divorce rates. See supra Part II.B.1.
188. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 7–13 (2000); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 148–
49 (1991) (“It is rarely if ever possible to isolate the effects of legal reform from social forces that
produced it.”).
189. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 59,
tbl.66 (2002).
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declining: 190
Among men who married in the 1970s, for example, about 23 percent had
divorced by the 10th year of marriage. Among similar men married in the
1980s, about 20 percent had divorced by the 10th year. Men married in
the 1990s are doing even better—with a 10-year divorce rate of 16
percent. 191

Indeed, marital relations appear stronger and more resilient. 192
Scholars have also expressed concern that the meaning and
importance of marriage may suffer from unilateral no-fault divorce in
particular when alternative means of protecting rights, such as “Marvin”
cohabitation contracts 193 and domestic partnership options have become
more accessible. 194 Because co-habitants can do much to secure
marriage-like rights via contracts and married couples can contract away
from the normal obligations of marriage, the lines are blurring. 195 Some
argue that unilateral no-fault divorce laws coupled with expanded rights
for cohabitants weakens the institution of marriage by undercutting the
social norm that marriage is a life-long commitment different from
simply living together. 196 Yet, given the modern popular belief that
marriage and cohabitation are both acceptable and different options, it is
not clear that creating an alternative to marriage is a problem. 197
Empirically, cohabitation looks different in practice than marriage as it
is usually entered into by younger people with less financial stability and
for shorter amounts of time. 198 Finally, marriage remains a popular and
well-regarded institution that people continue to fight to enter. 199
In sum, fault in divorce is still at issue in U.S. law because of the

190. See Carey & Parker-Pope, supra note 159.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The term “Marvin” cohabitation contracts refers to contracts between unmarried cohabitants
legitimized by the California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
194. Krause, supra note 103, at 293–94; Garrison, supra note 87, at 325–30.
195. Krause, supra note 103, at 293–94.
196. See, e.g., LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER HEALTHIER AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); Scott, supra note
54.
197. Garrison, supra note 87, at 325–31 (arguing that cohabitation and marriage have different
benefits and are experienced differently and therefore cohabitants should be treated differently than
married persons).
198. Id. at 323–24. See also Pamela Smock & Wendy Manning, Living Together Unmarried in
the United States: Demographic Perspectives and Implications for Family Policy, 26 LAW & POL’Y 87,
87–92, 96–98 (2004).
199. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 87, at 325; LETTY COTTIN POGREBIN, FAMILY POLITICS:
LOVE AND POWER ON AN INTIMATE FRONTIER 21–22, 24–26 (1983); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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prevalence of fault-regarding divorce as well as in states still requires
consensual divorce. Unilateral no-fault divorce is increasingly the norm
and properly reflects contemporary social mores. Divorce regulations
should focus on caregivers and children who have the most at stake and
suffer the most from unregulated unilateral no-fault divorce. No-fault
divorce provides the best forum for supporting post-divorce families,
easing tension and creating stability. Indeed, allowing fault into the
divorce process disproportionately harms caregivers and the children
affected by the well-being of such caregivers and cannot appropriately
help children by saving failed marriages.
III. THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL TORTS
Having set out why a determination of fault in divorce does not
coincide with the interests of children, the interest of their caregivers, or
societal norms, and therefore is not appropriate for divorce law, the
question is whether the law should contend with wrongdoing between
spouses in any context? Furthermore, what is the nature of the
wrongdoing that should be addressed by the law—should it differ from
the nature of fault in divorce? This Part argues for considering
wrongdoing between spouses exclusively within the context of torts and
under a heightened threshold for defining culpability.
The first subpart provides an outline of the law of spousal torts.
While spousal torts have been introduced in a number of jurisdictions,
such cases are rarely brought in the context of physical or emotional
abuse and are even more rarely successful. It then discusses why that is
and what can be done about it. Finally, the first subpart provides a legal
framework for how spousal torts should work, replete with examples for
clarity.
The second subpart argues the normative case for spousal torts. The
subpart argues for the benefits of spousal torts on three levels. First,
spousal torts are appropriate to ensure recourse against all physical and
extreme dignitary harms, and especially for those harms to which
caregivers are disproportionately vulnerable—domestic abuse. Second,
it argues that the relative rarity and punitive aspect of torts more fairly
punishes those wrongdoers who have committed physical and serious
dignity abuse than litigations over fault in divorce. Finally, the second
subpart concludes that tort law is an appropriate and powerful tool that
should be wielded in all instances of harm, in particular harms that are
more often faced by women.
The third subpart addresses critiques of spousal torts. Namely, it
considers arguments that identifying outrageous and extraordinary
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behavior is too difficult in the context of the subjective intimacy of
marriage, that allowing spousal torts will only increase acrimony
between divorcing spouses, that spousal torts ignore the complexity of
marital relations, and that spousal torts are too expensive and
impractical.
A. Contemporary Jurisprudence of Spousal Torts
1. The Lack of Recourse to Spousal Torts
Despite the fact that inter-spousal immunities have been almost
entirely abolished, abuse between spouses, both physical and emotional,
is rarely addressed in the tort context. 200 In the marital home, if the
abuse is physical, the law protects the vulnerable through criminal and
tortious domestic violence protection, although tort claims are rarely
used. 201 But emotional abuse in the home is the true orphan. A few
state statutes prohibiting domestic violence and enabling victims to
receive protection orders include psychological abuse, but they do not
provide for monetary redress. 202 Some states allow spouses to bring
torts for intentionally inflicting emotional abuse, but the tort is still
controversial and not widely accepted. 203
200. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 139, 153–54 (2005) (arguing that tort law and scholarship ignore the relevance of domestic
violence to tort doctrine because (1) torts has been conceptualized as pertaining primarily to accidental
injury and (2) because there are few domestic violence torts to even analyze).
201. See id. at 155–56; Sarah H. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal
Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 950 (2004)
(discussing various reasons the domestic violence torts are underused and arguing for a new tort of
domestic violence to cure judicial failure to provide proper recourse).
202. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2010) (making a civil protection order available for ‘Extreme
psychological abuse’ which is defined as “an intentional or knowing course of conduct directed at an
individual that seriously alarms or disturbs consistently or continually bothers the individual, and that
serves no legitimate purpose; provided that such course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to
suffer extreme emotional distress”); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 400.1501(d) (West 2010) (“[c]ausing
or attempting to cause physical or mental harm to a family or household member”).
203. See, e.g., Hendriksen v. Carrero, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993); Davis v. Bostik, 580 P.2d 544
(Or. 1978); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Col. Ct. App. 1988); McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). The tort of IIED
between spouses has been explicitly rejected in a number of states. See Weiker v. Weiker, 237 N.E.2d
876 (N.Y. 1968) (rejecting a IIED between spouses); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D.
1989); Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Wis. 1991) (barring an IIED action between spouses
because allowing it would undermine opposition to heart balm claims); Linda L. Berger, Lies Between
Mommy and Daddy: The Case for Recognizing Spousal Emotional Distress Claims Based on the
Domestic Deceit that Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 463 (2000);
see also Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Divorce: New
York’s Reluctance to Enter the Fray, 10 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 29 (2002). Many other states have yet
to address the issue.
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For instance, in Twyman v. Twyman the Texas Supreme Court
recognized the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) between spouses for conduct that occurred during their
marriage. 204 To make an IIED claim, one must prove intentional
conduct, that is extreme and outrageous, and that causes severe
distress. 205 The specific conduct alleged in Twyman was coercive
deviant sexual interactions, aggravated by a history of violent rape.206
In Twyman, Texas became the forty-seventh state to recognize a tortious
claim of IIED. 207 However, in permitting such claims between spouses,
especially in the context of a divorce, the Texas Supreme Court was at
the forefront of allowing money damages for emotional injuries between
spouses. Only a limited number of states, in limited circumstances,
allow such claims for purely emotional abuse that occurred during
marriage. 208 Yet, given the success courts have had in crafting a
sustainable and contained cause of action for such torts in these states, 209
the possibilities for providing this outlet for emotionally abused spouses
more broadly are evident. Indeed, despite the widespread acceptance of
IIED to provide recourse for dignitary harms among strangers,
emotional wrongs in the home are largely not addressed by the law
unless state law recognizes such abuses in the context of fault

204. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). The possibility of allowing negligent infliction of emotional
distress between spouses was also discussed in Twyman by the dissent. See id. 640–45 (Spector, J.,
dissenting). Since IIED is a more developed and accepted tort as between strangers, and would cover
the intentional dignitary harms between spouses that are arguably the most disturbing and culpable, it is
the focus of this Article. See TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE 90’S
109–110 (1990); W. PAGE KEATON et. al., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984);
Bradley Peacock, Recent Decision, 65 MISS. L.J. 763, 773 (1996).
205. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621.
206. Id. This Article does not intend to opine as to whether the facts in Twyman constitute IIED.
See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Queer Theory’s critique of the facts of Twyman). But, to the extent
that the facts in Twyman would constitute IIED as between strangers, assuming the man was aware of
the woman’s previous history of sexual assault, then it should be considered IIED as between spouses.
207. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621.
208. See Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (cause of action for IIED brought by husband regarding wife’s
failure to notify husband that child born during marriage was not his should be allowed and considered
separately from divorce); Bailey v. Searles-Bailey, 746 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); see also
supra note 203 and accompanying text; George C. Blum, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in
the Marital Context, 110 A.L.R.5th 371 (2003, with updates).
209. Only a limited number of claims have been brought in total in the U.S. See, e.g., Hakkila v.
Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N,M. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting argument that all such claims should be rejected
because they will cause an onslaught of meritless claims because only a limited number of claims had
been brought); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976) (When immunity is abolished, the
“‘uninvited kiss’” does not become a significant problem, since the court is competent to identify
frivolous claims.); see also Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590,
592 (Utah 1980) (citing Taylor v. Patten, 275 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1954), overruled in part by
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah 1963)).
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divorce, 210 even though it is widely acknowledged that domestic abuse
can be emotional in nature. 211
2. The Reasons That Spousal Torts Are Limited
The alternative outlet for airing grievances between spouses, fault
considerations in divorce, has considerably stunted adjudication of
spousal torts. 212 Before the advent of no-fault divorce, the vast majority
of states maintained immunities between spouses for torts. 213 Fault
divorce was the only avenue of recovery for an injured spouse. 214 Now,
there is potential overlap as the same wrongs could be tort grounds or
fault divorce grounds depending on a state’s willingness to consider
spousal torts, the breadth of such consideration, and the availability of
grounds for a fault divorce. 215 Such recoveries can be problematically
duplicative because they provide financial recourse for the same
wrongs. 216 There are a myriad of procedural impediments to bringing
both torts and fault divorce covering the same issues. 217 Strict no-fault
states are hesitant to allow fault between spouses to be considered in the
context of a tort suit for fear a remedy that was intended to have been
abolished is finding another outlet. 218 Fault–regarding states are mixed
as to the appropriate forum for considering fault and are legitimately
concerned about double recovery. Therefore, fault states often join the
two cases, harming the separate nature of the divorce process. 219 Courts
instinctively flinch when asked to consider torts that feel like fault
divorce, deferring to the specialized family law system. 220 The
210. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 55–64.
211. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891 (1992) (recognizing that
domestic violence can be purely psychological and committed in the form of forced social and economic
isolation, verbal harassment, threats of future violence, or destruction of personal property); see also Joy
M. Bingham, Protecting Victims by Working Around the System and Within the System: Statutory
Protection for Emotional Abuse in the Domestic Violence Context, 81 N.D. L. REV. 837 (2005).
212. See Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60 MONT. L. REV.
101, 101 (1999).
213. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538. See also CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 816–45 (2001); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1482–503 (2000).
214. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538.
215. Id. See also Twyman v. Twyman, 835 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
216. See, e.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
217. See Evans, supra note 4, at 481–89; see also infra notes 222–225.
218. See, e.g., Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989) (considering spousal torts a
violation of public policy supporting no-fault divorce).
219. See Whittington, 766 S.W.2d at 75.
220. Usually, by failing to find the adequate amount of intentionality, distress or outrageousness
necessary for a claim of IIED. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538–39; see also Hassing v. Wortman,
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confusion and conflict surrounding whether marital wrongs belong in
divorce or in torts litigation demonstrates the need to determine which is
the more suitable forum. 221 A clear and exclusive demarcation of a
place within torts for contending with wrongdoing during marriage is
needed to avoid potential ambiguity.
The procedural legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
have complicated and even prevented bringing claims for spousal torts
when fault is potentially relevant during a divorce. 222
Certain
jurisdictions, 223 as well as a number of legal scholars, 224 have argued
that all claims arising out of the same subject matter or nucleus of
facts—i.e., the marriage—should be litigated simultaneously as one
case, or at least by one court. 225 Failure to bring a tort claim during the
divorce process would prevent bringing a later tort suit for actions that
occurred during the marriage. If the same behavior is relevant in
divorce and in the tort process, joinder of the divorce and the tort makes
sense not only to avoid duplicative legal proceedings but also to avoid
double recovery for the same wrongdoing.
Yet, bringing a tort suit along with a divorce suit can create confusion
and elongation of the divorce process to the detriment of a spouse that
has suffered some grave harm and thus likely needs a quick escape from
the marriage. Fault considerations in divorce can, and usually do,
elongate proceedings by making spouses more defensive and less likely
to agree to the divorce, particularly if they have to part with additionally
money because of the accusations of fault. 226 Requiring joinder

333 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Neb. 1983); Wiener v. Wiener, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
221. See Buel, supra note 201, at 949, 998; Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and
Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 378 (1997) (general discussion of
problems arising out of joinder and analysis of case law dealing with joinder in various states).
222. For instance, in Twyman v. Twyman, fault was relevant to the divorce process and thus the
court allowed for joinder subject to the principles of res judicata. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d
619 (Tex. 1993). The court noted however, that if the tortious conduct was not relevant to the divorce,
joinder would not be appropriate. See also Evans, supra note 4, at 481–89 (thorough review of potential
procedural problems that litigants have faced in court because of judicial confusion over where such
claims belong); Barbara Glesner Fines, Joinder of Tort Claims in Divorce Actions, 12 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW 285, 289 (1994) (same, concluding that voluntary joineder is most appropriate);
Dalton, supra note 221, at 378.
223. See, e.g., Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979) (arguing that divorce and torts should be
joined under a “single controversy” rule). States have also made joinder mandatory on a case by case
basis. See Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So.2d 482 (Ala. 1990); Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1986).
224. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata, 24 FAM. L.Q.
127 (1990) (arguing for the propriety of mandatory joinder).
226. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2553 (“An abusive husband who stands to lose more of his
property or pay mor support as a result of his past deeds may pull out more stops to keep her around.”).
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prevents victims from bringing domestic abuse torts when they are
focused on extracting themselves from the marriage as quickly as
possible. 227 Distancing fault considerations in torts from the divorce
process will promote the safety of the abused through timely legal
separation, while still providing later financial recourse to the victim. 228
Litigating a tort for marital wrongdoing and separate from divorce
allows the needed separation and quick escape from an abusive
marriage. 229
Moreover, the need to join a spousal tort case with a divorce confuses
what should be two very different processes with different goals. 230
Keeping the process of punishing culpable behavior and providing
monetary recourse in tort will best allow judges to focus on what I argue
should be the goal of divorce: ensuring adequate support of dependents
of the marriage and optimizing post-divorce relations between parents
and children. 231 The subject matter of divorce and spousal torts is
mostly different, 232 and the goals are entirely different. Simply because
the spouses are married does not make all their interactions in need of
judicial intervention appropriate for one court. For instance, juries
should be available for torts in a manner totally inappropriate in
divorce. 233 Criminal and civil proceedings that resolve the same
disputes are separated because of different legal standards that apply and
distinctive purposes of the criminal and civil system. 234 This same
reasoning should apply in family law and civil torts when different
227. See Wriggins, supra note 200, at 155–56; Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 140–41 (2001) (arguing that bringing tort claims together with divorce claims can
put the plaintiff’s economic or physical survival, or relationship with children at risk); Dalton, supra
note 221, at 387.
228. Dalton, supra note 221, at 390.
229. Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1998).
230. See, e.g., Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909, 912 (N.H. 1987) (the purpose of divorce is to
dissolve a marriage whereas the purpose of a tort suit is to compensate injuries); Heacock v. Heacock,
520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988).
231. See supra Part II.B.1.
232. Custody decisions would have to look at the conduct of the spouses to the extent the conduct
harms the child. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), jurisdictional motion
overruled by, 551 N.E.2d 1304 (Ohio 1990); Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1994)
(threatening behavior, including threats of a hit man, significant enough to sustain IIED tort); Ward v.
Ward, 583 A.2d 577, 581 (Vt. 1990).
234. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (finding the
difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel since the acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented “an
adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused”); State v. Enebak, 272 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. 1978); see generally, Andrew Z. Glickman, Civil
Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel
Proceedings After U.S. v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990).
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purposes and goals are involved, particularly when fault is not even
adjudicated in the divorce process. 235 In fact, the lack of fault
consideration in most divorce law makes joinder particularly
inappropriate as discussion of abusive behavior could cloud the remedial
purpose of the divorce process. 236 Claim preclusion should not arise
from settlement agreements in the divorce process either. 237 Settlement
agreements regularly purport to release all the parties from all “property
rights” between them or “claims, rights and duties arising or growing out
of said marital relationship”; torts do not arise from the marriage nor do
they concern property rights. 238 Preclusion of tort claims has been
unjustifiably allowed based on such settlement agreements. 239 A release
of a tort claim could be separately negotiated.
3. Reorienting Marital Wrongs in the Context of Torts
Reorienting the litigation of wrongdoing between spouses in the
context of torts demands redefining what kind of wrongdoing is
judiciable between spouses and when. Therefore, this Article develops
the particulars of spousal wrongs that should be considered spousal torts.
First, as a precursor to the discussion of the nature of spousal torts, in
the context of divorce, many, if not all, courts take into account the
dissipation of assets in determining equitable property distribution. 240
This is the only wrongdoing that should appropriately remain in the
divorce context. Such economic fault seems eminently relevant in
determining property distribution although other fault should not be
considered. Just as monetary contributions, debt, and child caregiving
efforts are relevant for equitable distribution purposes, economic
dissipation should be relevant too. Such factors are all relevant for how
the couples’ property at the end of marriage came into being and thus
how it should be divided equitably. If such dissipation is relevant in
divorce, it should not be also recoverable as a tort to avoid double

235. See, e.g., Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing
Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1253 (1994).
236. See Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602, 603–04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Glesner Fines,
supra note 222, at 289.
237. See, e.g., Janet W. Steversen, Interspousal Tort Claims in a Divorce Action in Oregon, 31
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 757, 776–77 (1995).
238. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So.2d 482, 483–85 (Ala. 1990); Overberg v. Lusby, 921
F.2d 90, 91–92 (6th Cir. 1990); Slansky v. Slansky, 553 A.2d 152, 153–54 (Vt. 1988); Jackson v. Hall,
460 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Ala. 1984).
239. Hall, 460 S.2d at 1292.
240. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; Krause, supra note 4, at 1364; Beltran v. Beltran,
227 Cal. Rptr. 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Marriage of Foster, 227 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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recovery. In any event, it is not usually extraordinary and outrageous.
Adultery, the most typical of grounds for divorce, by itself should not
be grounds for spousal torts. 241 Historically, the purpose of marriage
was community building and the complete, life-long “channeling of
sexual expression” into a monogamous relationship. 242 Accordingly,
children born out of wedlock were treated particularly harshly by the
law as “bastards.” 243 Yet, now, we do not treat children born out of
wedlock as illegitimate and any such treatment has largely been deemed
unconstitutional. 244 Moreover, while adultery clearly is still frowned
upon, 245 and can have significant effects on people’s careers if they are
in the public spotlight, it is also relatively common. 246 It is not deemed
a huge impingement on societal interests and is not punished with direct
legal ramifications as it once was, 247 particularly in the age of nofault. 248 For instance, in some states an adulterer was legally prohibited
from marrying his accomplice, but all such laws have since been
repealed. 249 Moreover, where adultery was once a breach of criminal
law, 250 it is doubtful that any such law could pass constitutional muster
after Lawrence v. Texas. 251
241. Spaht, supra note 75, at 258.
242. Id. See also supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
243. Spaht, supra note 75, at 258.
244. See Levy v. La., 391 U.S. 68 (1968), remanded to sub nom., Levy v. State ex rel. Charity
Hosp. of La. at New Orleans Bd. of Adm’rs, 216 So.2d 818 (La. 1968); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977); Ralph Calhoun Brashier, Half-Bloods, Inheritance, and Family, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 215,
236 (2007).
245. See William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 1046–47 (2001) (citing a
number of surveys and sources that indicate that an overwhelming majority of Americans say that
adultery is wrong).
246. See id. (citing surveys that suggest high adultery rates); see also Carey & Parker-Pope, supra
note 159.
247. Unless the adultery occurs in the context of a religious (even if not state) marriage and the
state chooses to pursue a polygamous offender. See Katherine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage,
20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 191 (1991) (discussing the prosecution of Thomas Green in State v. Green,
2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820, on criminal polygamy charges).
248. Spaht, supra note 75, at 261 (“Even though the public continues to impose a legal obligation
of fidelity upon the spouses in their personal relationship and permits an immediate divorce for the
betrayed spouse, it has in every other respect withdrawn any punishment on behalf of society at large for
conduct once considered violative of the public interest, punishment intended to protect the marital
relationship from destructive outside forces.”).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 161 (2009) (“In case of divorce, on account of adultery,
the guilty party can never hereafter contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in adultery, under the
penalty of being considered and prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy . . . .”).
251. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court’s reasoning would call into question the constitutionality of “criminal laws against fornication,
bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity”); Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v.
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In fact, spouses themselves are often willing to overlook adultery and
remain in their marriages. 252 Although societal status no longer
necessarily mandates that spouses stay in broken marriages, modern
marriage—in accordance with the ideal of joining with one’s soul
mate 253 —is more complex than just the context for monogamous sexual
relations. Marriage, in other words, is built on more than its sexual
“essentials.” 254 While infidelity is a common reason for divorce,
surveys indicate that the majority of people, who know or have reason to
know their spouse is cheating, remain married for years afterward. 255
Conduct that constitutes physical violence should be actionable as a
battery or assault and perhaps facilitated through the use of continuous
torts. 256 Moreover, emotional distress claims can and should be brought
as corollaries to physical torts. 257 This must be the case even though
physical abuse is not uncommon—society must deem such abuse to be
an outrage. 258
The harder question regarding spousal torts is defining IIED beyond
physical abuse. The focus of IIED is the extreme and outrageous
behavior, 259 which is actionable only if it causes severe emotional
distress. 260 In all contexts, including between spouses, courts want to
avoid being involved in litigating “meanness” that is not “outrageous” or
“beyond the bounds of decency” and so look for abusive behavior that
goes “beyond the normal ebb and flow of married life.” 261 The behavior
identified must be so outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.” 262 As
discussed above, adultery alone, given how unexceptional it has

Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165
(2006); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas,
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837 (2006).
252. See Carey & Parker-Pope, supra note 159.
253. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
254. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
255. See Carey & Parker-Pope, supra note 159.
256. See, e.g., Giovone v. Giovone, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). Further
discussion of battered women’s syndrome is beyond the scope of this Article.
257. See, e.g., Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Me. 1993); see also Buel, supra note
201, at 985–87; Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L.
REV. 183, 213–20 (1995) (citing a number of cases where IIED is allowed due to physical abuse).
258. See Weiner, supra note 257 at 220–25 (pointing to the relative frequency of domestic
violence and arguing for a per se “outrageous” standard for domestic violence).
259. See id. at 200 (indicating that outrage is the most important element of the tort); Ellman,
supra note 63, at 795.
260. See supra Part III.A.1.
261. See, e.g., Leornard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow . . . Infliction
of Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389, 397 (1995).
262. Id.
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become, 263 and how spouses themselves so often overlook it, would not
qualify for the tort of intentional infliction of distress—it simply does
not “shock the conscience.” 264 In addition, because of the significant
change in sexual norms in the contemporary era, traditional heartbalm
torts, still available in a few states, would not be appropriate for
litigation under this framework. 265 Breaking a promise to marry, even if
it led to sexual intercourse, causing single parenthood, or engaging in
adultery are actions that by themselves are not outrageous, without other
facts that might shock the conscience. On the other hand, a wife’s
repeated threats to hire a hit man to have her husband murdered 266 and a
wife’s knowing failure to inform her husband that a child during the
marriage was not his, have appropriately risen to the level of IIED. 267
In order to shed some light on the distinction between culpable
behavior that is not tortious and extraordinary dignitary harms that are,
this Article provides a few examples of what might be deemed
outrageous behavior. Of course, doctrinally, in order to recover, the
spouse also must experience severe distress from such outrageous
behavior and must prove intent by demonstrating either intentional or
reckless behavior.
a. Aggravated Adultery
Under the theory expressed here, it has already been indicated that the
run of the mill adulterer—however morally degenerate—could not be
liable for IIED on that basis alone. But, what about the adulterer who is

263. See supra notes 246–255 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617 (Md. 2000); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (eleven year adulterous affair not sufficiently outrageous); Poston v. Poston,
436 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Unless, however, the adulterous conduct was indeed beyond the
ordinary “cheating” behavior and reached extraordinary heights. See discussion of “aggravated
adultery,” infra Part III.A.3.a.
265. Historically, American law provided recourse for deceptive and undesirable sexual activity in
the form of heartbalm torts that provided recourse for a broken heart caused by sexual fraud. See, e.g.,
Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2008). The four torts
referred to as heartbalm torts are: (1) alienation of affections (a third party causes estrangement between
spouses); (2) criminal conversation (a third party’s adulterous relationship with a plaintiff’s wife,
usually); (3) seduction (an unmarried woman’s father and the woman herself could make a claim for
injury resulting from premarital sex or unwed motherhood); and (4) breach of marriage promise (a
promise of future marriage induced a woman to engage in sexual behavior that she would not have but
for the promise and expectation of marriage). See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 245, at 1002–03.
266. Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1994). See also Bozman v. Bozman,
830 A.2d 450 (Md. 2003); Vance v. Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (Wife permitted to
recover against husband in IIED claim alleging that husband attempted to hire someone to murder her.).
267. Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), jurisdictional motion overruled
by, 551 N.E.2d 1304 (Ohio 1990).
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later sued for sexual harassment or sexual assault by one of his
attempted or actual mistresses? Should he also be subject to suit for
IIED by his wife if she can prove that he acted in order to cause her
distress or was reckless in causing her distress? Does the aggravated
nature of the adultery being forced, or in some manner abusive, justify a
suit by the perpetrator’s wife as well? It certainly adds another level of
humiliation, but is it extraordinary and outrageous?
On these facts alone, probably not because, if so, any married person
subject to a sexual harassment or sexual assault suit would then be
subject to a suit in tort by his or her spouse. While having your spouse
sued for sexual assault of another woman is not mundane, these facts
alone in today’s litigious society are not extraordinary—particularly if
the spouse is ultimately not convicted. Yet, additional aggravating
circumstances could make this situation clearly extraordinary. Imagine
the sexual assault claim is brought by the wife’s sister and the husband
is convicted. Imagine the assaulting spouse, who is eventually
convicted, implicates the spouse in his activities by having her testify on
his behalf or liquidating her resources. What if the couple’s children
were in the house when the assault occurred and the husband recklessly
or even intentionally allowed them to view the assault? Such facts start
to reach a “shock to the conscience” level and become extraordinary,
even if the wife would not be able to bring a criminal charge against her
husband. 268 Although it is difficult to articulate a precise standard, such
outrageous facts are not particularly hard to conceive of and should be
actionable as determined by a jury.
b. Aggravated Bullying
A wife who mildly or moderately bullies her husband would also not
be liable for IIED. A wife who screams at her husband and throws him
out of the house does not shock the conscience and should not be subject
to a dignitary tort regardless of how mean she might be. Yet,
extraordinary circumstances are possible. A wife might make her
husband honestly fear for his life. A wife who hides the couple’s
children without allowing him access for an extended period of time and
without serious provocation is acting outrageously. While tort remedies
are often available once custodial rights are assigned during divorce or
separation, 269 during the marriage custodial rights are assumed rather
268. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1268, 1337–42 (1996) (discussing an exception to their argument against emotional spousal
abuse as a tort when a criminal case could be brought against the spouse for actions to his/her spouse).
269. See Berger, supra note 203, at 501–02.
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than ordered making the availability of an IIED claim necessary.270 The
bully spouse who does outlandish things in order to cause harm to her
spouse, like threaten and interfere with a spouse’s close relationships
and work situations causing serious struggle and disarray in a person’s
life, might also be subject to a claim of IIED, depending on the specific
circumstances. 271 Similarly, a spouse who deprives his dependent
spouse and/or children of the basic necessities of life, like food,
acceptable living conditions, or an education, may be subject to a
dignitary tort as well. 272
The relevance of marriage to a finding of IIED is complex but
ultimately discernible. 273 The fact that the parties are married is relevant
in considering the nature of the relationship and the impact the conduct
would have on the plaintiff. For instance, when a spouse rapes his
wife’s sister, that the parties were married would impact a claim for
IIED because of the conduct’s impact and level of outrageousness. Yet,
in determining outrageousness between spouses, the bullying standards
should not be lower than between strangers because of the “trust” that
has developed in a married couple because that level of trust is too
subjective and outrageousness is objective. Bullying conduct that would
be “outrageous” enough between strangers, should be sufficiently
outrageous between spouses.
Ultimately, the inquiry is extremely fact specific and jury dependent.
IIED has been extremely hard to prove. Thus, those worried that it will
encompass too much marital behavior and be too much of an invasion
on marital privacy would have to explain why it would be different than
other contexts to which the tort has remained contained, 274 and why it is
different than physical abuse in which marital privacy has been
rightfully dismissed as a reason not to adjudicate. Just as in non-spousal
IIED cases, as well as torts generally, there are bound to be

270. See, e.g., Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990) (rejecting the tort of interference
with custody as being contrary to the best interests of the children, but willing to consider an IIED action
based on the same conduct if the latter is egregious); see also Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of
Emotional Distress Claims in Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 67–68 (1993) (contrasting
claims for IIED with claims for interference with custodial rights).
271. See, e.g., Christians v. Christians, 637 N.W.2d 377 (S.D. 2001) (finding IIED where husband
interfered with employer in an outrageous manner).
272. One thing the seminal case of McGuire v. McGuire case teaches family law students is that a
married couple can act horribly to each other within the context of an ongoing marriage McGuire v.
McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to enforce husband’s duty to provides necessaries to
wife based on the doctrine of privacy where wife alleges husband withholds money and basic
provisions).
273. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of Ellman and Sugarman’s argument that as between
spouses extraordinary conduct is too subjective to be identified.
274. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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inconsistencies between cases because judgments are jury dependent. 275
But that does not detract from the need for tortious recourse for serious
emotional abuse. What is “extreme and outrageous” is dependent on
social norms and realities and is thus best left determined by juries in all
contexts. Such behavior should be punished through monetary rewards.
IIED is an outlet for dignitary harms that is not context specific, and it
should not be context exclusive by excluding the marriage. 276
B. Advantages of Spousal Torts
The tort process, which is intended to deal with civil disputes
assigning fault and blame, is the appropriate exclusive forum for
contending with marital wrongs. This subpart posits three reasons for
promoting spousal torts. First, torts provide monetary redress for
extraordinary and outrageous harms between spouses that would be
recoverable as between strangers. Domestic abuse should not be
privileged from litigation. Second, a tort remedy is more appropriate
given contemporary societal norms that support focus on protecting
caregivers and children in the divorce process. Third, the power of torts
should be wielded to counter gendered harms.
1. Providing Monetary Redress for Domestic Abuse
Harms judiciable as between strangers should also be judiciable as
between spouses. Otherwise, domestic abuse is more protected from
litigation than similar wrongs, which is discriminatory against women
and contradicts the societal consensus for the need to protect against
domestic abuse.
Primary caregivers, who are usually women, are more tied to home
life because they spend more time caring for dependent children and
spend more time working in the home, even if they also work in the
marketplace. 277
As discussed above, women are therefore
disproportionately vulnerable to punishment under traditional concepts
of marital fault by being denied property, alimony, and custody. 278
Moreover, women are more likely to be the abused party when domestic

275. Compare Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing recovery on
spousal IIED claim) with Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (denying recovery).
276. See Buel, supra note 201, at 987.
277. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 17, at 167–76; HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 14
(documenting the phenomena of the “second shift” whereby even women who work “full-time” do
much more of the household work).
278. See supra Part II.C.2.
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abuse occurs, and therefore need to be able to get out of the marriage as
quickly as possible, without contending with difficult evidentiary issues
of fault. 279 Both these gendered arguments favor leaving fault out of
divorce. On the other hand, if serious wrongs mounting to the level of
marital domestic physical or emotional abuse are not punished at all, it is
women, who are usually the victims of serious physical and emotional
abuse in the home that are left without recourse. This is logical because
women are both more present in and more dependent on the home and
are more physically and emotionally vulnerable to such abuse. 280
It has been noted that, “[a]s feminists have demanded new protections
for women in the public sphere, we [feminists] seem to have
simultaneously acquiesced to a reductionist vision of moral
responsibility in the domestic sphere. Ironically, this is the sphere in
which women are most at risk of economic, physical, and emotional
injury.” 281 In the workplace, in the criminal system, and in the context
of domestic physical violence, feminists advocate recognition of
women’s abuse. If abuse occurs in the workplace, whether it is physical
or emotional, the law addresses such abuse in the context of sexual
harassment laws, criminal laws, or civil torts. While emotional injury in
the workplace, classified as sexual harassment, was originally
prosecuted in order to assure workplace equality, justifications for
sexual harassment have since been broadened. 282 Instead, scholars
argue that sexual harassment should be understood to inflict tortious
dignitary harm, allowing sexual harassment in prisons, and other nonworkplace public settings. 283 Criminal law and tort law increasingly
addresses physical or emotional abuse suffered by women in the public

279. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000) (finding that in 2001, 85% of domestic violence victims were women);
Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned
About Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 786–87 (2003)
(recognizing that governments usually do not interfere with domestic violence issues and therefore fail
to protect women victims); Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat.
1902, 1941 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2006), declared unconstitutional by United States
v. Morrison, 120 U.S. 598 (2000)) (noting that victims of domestic violence are usually women); Ileana
Arias et al., Violence Against Women: The State of Batterer Prevention Programs, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 157 (2002).
280. See Buel, supra note 201, at 958, 962 (men are usually the perpetrators and initiators of
domestic abuse).
281. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2528.
282. Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The Challenges of Creating Sexual Harassment
Protections for Non-Workplace Settings (U. of S. Cal. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No.
24, 2009), http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lss/art24.
283. Id. See also Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
445, 487 (1997).
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sphere, whether in the workplace or other institutional setting. 284
Excluding dignitary harms inflicted in the home from tort law
neglects a significant area of harm, which is usually suffered by women.
In fact, any reason for such exclusion would be discriminatory against
women—deeming domestic disputes too private, too emotional, and too
subjective for judicial determination. 285 Abuse usually suffered by
women can be addressed through the civil arena of torts just as any
personal injury claim can. 286 Allowing a case for IIED between spouses
is not injecting a tort recovery in lieu of fault divorce; rather, it is merely
providing a remedy to an aggrieved party available to every other citizen
of the state. 287
2. Redefining Marital Wrongdoing in a Contemporary Context
Traditional fault grounds developed in a hierarchal society in which
different gender roles for men and women were mandated. 288 The
nature of conduct necessitating serious legal punishment has
transformed. The analysis above, narrowing and reorienting marital
wrongs in the contexts of torts, gives adjudication of marital wrongs a
much needed update. 289 Prosecuting instances of adultery and judicial
resolution of heartbalm torts at one point reflected the core of marriage
and intimate relations, 290 but judicial resolution is no longer appropriate
in light of the self-fulfilling visions of marriage previously discussed. 291
Moreover, in accordance with contemporary societal mores, under
which divorce should focus on the plight of caregivers and their
dependents, 292 tort law is a more suitable outlet for spousal wrongs.
First, not all wrongdoing between spouses is judiciable; much of the

284. Id.
285. This critique will be taken up in more detail in infra Part III.C.1. See Wriggins, supra note
200, at 154; Reva B. Seigel, The Rule of Love, Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2119–20 (1996); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d. 619, 640–05 (Spector, J., dissenting) (arguing
that both IIED and negligent infliction of emotional distress should be available as recourse against
spousal wrongdoing to recognize tortious harm women are more likely to experience).
286. McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Wyo. 2001); Christians v. Christians, 637 N.W.2d
377, 382 (stating that the court was not “injecting a tort recovery for intentional infliction of emotional
distress” into every domestic suit, but rather, that it was “only providing a remedy to an aggrieved
party . . . available to every other citizen of the state.”).
287. Christians, 637 N.W.2d at 377.
288. See Singer, supra note 6, at 1111–12.
289. See supra Part III.A.3.
290. See supra notes 265–267 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part II.B.1; Krause, supra note 4, at 1365 (discussing the need to update notions of
spousal wrongdoing); Spaht, supra note 75, at 258 (analyzing outdated notions of fault).
292. See supra Part II.B.1.
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harms are mutual accounts of resentment and pain that are better
handled by a therapist than by a judge. 293 Torts would not be available
for all wrongdoing but only for physical abuse and extraordinary and
outrageous intentional dignitary harms that cause severe distress. 294
Such torts make consideration of marital wrongdoing significantly less
frequent than fault-driven divorce and fault-regarding divorce do. 295
Such a system may have been relevant where the state had a strong
interest in keeping all marriages together, but not in light of more
contemporary perspectives on marriage. 296 In that way, the focus of
divorce remains on caregivers and dependents and only in extreme cases
are financial penalties levied on deserving wrongdoers in a separate suit
in the context of torts. Primary caregivers and the dependent children
for whom they care, who are in need of support and should be protected
by divorce laws, will only find themselves in financial ruin because of
extreme and outrageous behavior on the part of a caregiver, in which
case primary custody should in any event be questioned. 297 All
indications are that spousal torts are and will continue to be relatively
rare and saved for extreme circumstances. 298
As compared to fault-regarding divorce, tort law more fairly provides
financial recourse to whichever spouse has suffered the physical or
emotional abuse. In divorce law, a determination of wrongdoing,
particularly adultery, was traditionally used to bar, decrease, or
completely discharge an obligation of alimony or, more recently,
decrease the equitable share of property distribution. 299 That financial
support is usually paid by a primary earner to a primary caregiver. If the
primary caregiver is at fault, a reduction in the financial incidents of
divorce punishes that caregiver for her wrongdoing by denying her this
needed support. If the higher earner is at fault, then he could be forced
to pay more than an otherwise equitable share of his property and
293. See supra Part II.B.2.
294. See supra Part III.A.
295. See supra Part II.A.
296. See supra Part II.A.1, II.B.1; HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 89, at 285–86 (arguing for a
civil remedy as opposed to marital grounds remedy for marital wrongs because the injury of infidelity is
one to the spouse and under current social mores, not a harm committed against the state; such a penalty
should be in the form of property distribution “bonus” or a separate civil remedy); see also ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 49–53.
297. See supra Part III.A.3.
298. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
299. See Singer, supra note 7, at 1461, 1474; Wardle, supra note 2, at 115 n.148 (Adoption of nofault divorce “has created significant problems for the justification of the imposition of any postdissolution continuing spousal support or sharing obligation.”); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony,
77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1989) (Modern divorce reform has completely undermined traditional
justifications for alimony.); Ellman, supra note 63, at 787.
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potentially higher alimony. As discussed above, any such system has a
greater impact on the caregiver who cannot rely on a continuing salary,
and thus such punishment should only come in the wake of relatively
rare, extraordinary abuse. 300
Moreover, divorce rewards are an
equitable system of property division and continuing support,301 which
are potentially subject to later modification based on totally unrelated
scenarios. 302 There are many factors involved in determining divorce
awards with the overriding goal being to support the separation of
families and to provide a sustainable life for the divided family going
forward. 303 A change in alimony would still be in the context of issues
beyond fault and would generally not “wipe out” one of the two
parties. 304 Alternately, tort law traditionally acts to reward the victim
and not just reduce a financial obligation. 305 A determination of serious
wrongdoing should not only adjust equitable rewards but also have the
potential to be a financial boon, with punitive damages potentially
available. 306 Behavior worthy of severe reprimand to the perpetrator
and a financial windfall for the victim as between strangers should be
similarly punished in the tort system as between spouses. Personal
injury law is applicable to separate property of the spouses if brought
simultaneously and joined, or, in the preferred circumstances tort
recovery after divorce, would apply to the spouse’s post-divorce
property. 307 Tort law can be punitive and can leave someone financially
needy because of abusive behavior. Divorce law should not leave
anyone destitute—it should separate families and provide equitable
relief. 308
3. Harnessing the Power of Torts
Finally, it is crucial that feminists focus on the use of torts to redress
wrongs that women suffer. 309 Tort law is a central focal point for
determining social norms, and anytime women are disproportionately

300. See supra Part II.C.2 and note 209 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 60, at 511.
302. See Dalton, supra note 221, at 390.
303. See supra Part II.A.1, 2.
304. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 60, at 511.
305. See Krause, supra note 4, at 1365–66.
306. See id.; Dalton, supra note 221, at 390.
307. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W. 2d 619, 625 n.20 (Tex. 1993); see also Barbara H.
Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L. 489, 511 (1989).
308. See Evans, supra note 4, at 491.
309. See, e.g., Wriggins, supra note 200, at 140.
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harmed, that should be integrated into the tort system. 310 The failure to
recognize certain torts and defining the parameters of tort have gendered
implications. 311 It is problematic for domestic abuse to be separated
from other physically and emotional abusive behavior as “relationship
trouble” and not be part of the general social fabric of wrongs that need
recourse. 312 Unlike in areas of constitutional law, criminal law, or
family law, where women’s issues are a specialized subset of those legal
systems, torts mainstreams the issue into a “decentralized, egalitarian
decision-making system—the jury.” 313 Such mainstreaming allows
women to feel that their particular experiences and complaints are
worthy of attention as part of critical tort doctrines—they do not need to
be separated out or put in parentheses. 314 Moreover, tort law is not
fraught with the hierarchal history of family law. 315
Unlike
constitutional law and employment law that deal with discrimination and
stereotyping, or family law that deals with special doctrines that affect
women, torts can contend with gender in a generalized manner because
it redresses all wrongs that are suffered by an individual.
C. Addressing Critiques of Spousal Torts
1. Spousal Torts Are Too Intimate To Be Objectively Adjudicated
In an influential article, 316 Ira Ellman and Stephen Sugarman argue
that although physical violence between spouses should be subject to

310. See id.
311. See id. at 142.
312. See Buel, supra note 201, at 976.
313. Wriggins, supra note 200, at 140.
314. Regina Austin, Super Size Me and the Conundrum of Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Class for
the Contemporary Law-Genre Documentary Filmmaker, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 687, 713 (2007); Lucinda
M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 41, 43 (1989) (“Acknowledgment of gender issues in torts can help women feel less like
outsiders to the enterprise of the law, and may encourage them to engage in open dialogue, to bring up
their experiences, to scrutinize the exclusiveness or inclusiveness of various legal rules, and to raise
previously unraised questions.”).
315. See, e.g., COTT, supra note 111, at 7 (“A man’s headship of a family, his taking the
responsibility for dependent wife and children, qualified him to be a participating member of a state.”);
Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2
(2004); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM 1–13, 17–35 (1991).
316. Excerpts of the article have been included and the article itself cited in numerous family
casebooks, see, for example, JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS (2006) and HARRY D. KRAUSE ET. AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QUESTIONS (2004), and the article has been cited extensively elsewhere (according to a Westlaw search
it has been cited in 41 law review articles and treatises).
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tort suits, emotional abuse generally should not. 317 They contend that
determining “extreme and outrageous” conduct between married
couples—one of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress—is not a judicially determinable concept because of
the subjective nature of marital relations. 318 They argue that marital
relations are too personal and diverse to be subject to an objective
scrutiny of conduct that is “outrageous.” 319 Instead they argue that only
behavior that would be considered criminal toward the spouse should be
actionable in a tort of IIED. 320
But what makes marital relations so different from other subjective
and personal relationships? There are many complex and even intimate
relationships that are subject to tortious recovery for emotional abuse:
workplace relations, institutional relations such as prisoners and prison
guards, 321 student-teacher relations and/or relations between congregants
and pastors or patients and doctors/psychologists, non-married lovers, or
best-friends. Such relations can be just as complicated and difficult to
scrutinize objectively. Thus, excluding only married couples from the
possibility of emotional torts must be carefully justified.
One difference is the emotional nature of the marital relations, which
are intended to be more love-based and emotive than workplace
relations (though not necessarily different than non-married couples). 322
Yet, in other legal contexts the emotional nature of the relations has not
justified exemptions from legal recourse. For instance, in contracts
between spouses, society has not credited the emotional nature of the
relations with sufficient weight to reject the enforceability of spousal
contracts, 323 although some states insist on some protective measures
before enforcing spousal contracts to protect the spouse who is less
informed, less powerful, or has more to lose. 324 In the context of torts,
where the goal is expressly to give redress to the abused spouse, the
emotional nature of the relationship should have even less influence than

317. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 268, at 1317–26, 1340–42.
318. Id. at 1318. (citing Massey v. Massey, 801 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tx. Ct. App. 2001) (“The
bounds of decency vary from legal relationship to legal relationship. The marital relationship is highly
subjective and constituted by mutual understandings and interchanges which are constantly in flux, and
any number of which can be viewed by some segments of society as outrageous.”).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1337–42.
321. See Rich, supra note 282.
322. See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324–25 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
323. See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (treating contracts between spouses in the
same manner as contracts between strangers).
324. See, e.g., Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990); UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1984).
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in contracts. 325 Moreover, in the context of rape, which is intimately
interconnected with the sexual “essentials” of marriage, 326 the subjective
and complicated nature of the relations continues to have some effect on
the ease of prosecutions, but the effect is waning. 327 While the claim of
marital rape used to be completely unavailable, it is gaining in
acceptance. 328 In fact, with regard to civil or criminal orders of
protection, the emotional nature of the relations has afforded greater,
more specialized attention. 329 Accordingly, the emotional nature of
marital relations should not exclude adjudication of abuse between
spouses; rather, as in other areas of law, sensitivity to the real harms that
can be suffered must be acknowledged.
Another difference between spousal torts and other dignitary harms is
whether they occur in the public or private sphere—in the home or
outside it. 330 Keeping the private sphere out of torts has been squarely
rejected when the abuse is physical and should be similarly rejected with
regard to emotional abuse. 331 Privacy infamously has been used as a
cloak for hiding paternalistic sentiments in which men are deemed rulers
of their households making public scrutiny inappropriate. 332 For
instance, in Hakkila v. Hakkila, the court found that identifying blatantly
325. See Fraces E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1516–18 (1983) (describing the move of the law back into the family life in order
to redress issues of inequality and abuse).
326. The “essentials” of marriage is a term coined in the context of determining what constitutes
fraud in entering a marriage agreement. Traditional case law, which is still applicable in most
jurisdictions, only accepts fraud claims based on deceit or trickery regarding an essential or “sexual”
element of the marriage, such as infertility, impotence, virginity, pregnancy, possession of venereal
diseases, etc. See, e.g., Johnston v. Johnston, 18 Cal.App.4th 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
husband’s lazy, unshaven, and drunk behavior insufficient to prove fraud); Stepp v. Stepp, No.
03CA0052-M, 2004 WL 626116 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004) (disallowing annulment based on
fraudulent portrayal of assets).
327. See Hasday, supra note 213, 1482–523.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Judith Smith, Battered Wives and Unequal Protective-Order Coverage: A Call for
Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 105–08 (2005); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We
Know that For Sure? Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 9–10 (2004).
330. See Weiner, supra note 257, at 207–08.
331. See Olsen, supra note 325, at 1498–501 (describing the legal perspective of the family as the
private, altruistic female realm as opposed to the market which is the public, male productive sphere).
332. For an examples of a historic case in which horrendous abuse is rejected in the context of
marriage due to concerns for the privacy of the couple, see Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 305–09 (Me.
1877) (entering a nonsuit against the former wife where her ex-husband with friends forcibly kidnapped
her and had her institutionalized in a mental institution), overruled by Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d
1135 (Me. 1993). See also Seaquist & Kelley, supra note 203, at 31; Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206,
210 (N.C. 1920) (“Whenever a man has laid open his wife’s head with a bludgeon, put out her eye,
broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from liability to her on the ground that he
vowed at the altar to ‘love, cherish, and protect’ her.”); Buel, supra note 201, at 975.
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abusive behavior, including physical abuse, as “beyond our capacity”
because of the regular abuse that occurs within many marriages. 333 This
kind of reasoning must be rejected; it is deeply prejudicial to victims of
marital abuse. Behavior that meets the high standards for IIED—that
“shocks the conscience”—does so within the marital context as well.
Although it is argued that some spouses are simply used to being mean
to one another, conduct that rises to the level of abuse, that is
“extraordinary,” should not be protected because it occurs within a
marriage. Even (or especially) within a marriage, behavior that a jury
objectively determines to be objectively emotionally abusive should be
subject to societal condemnation through torts. Ultimately, determining
what conduct is extreme and outrageous is a very difficult inquiry in any
context, 334 but it has proved to be both feasible and defensible. 335 So
too in the context of marital relations, the outrageous emotional abuse
can and should be identified. 336
2. Spousal Torts Will Create Even More Acrimony than Fault Divorce
Despite his belief in the continuing relevance of fault in marital
relations at the time of divorce, Harry Krause argues forcefully against
allowing fault during marriage to pervade the area of tort litigation
because “tort law will reintroduce to the end of marriage more and
worse acrimony than no-fault divorce ever eliminated.” 337 But why
should that be? If the divorce is already procured, custody and support
issues already determined the dispute becomes a purely financial one,
like any other tort. Logically, the acrimony should be lessened as
compared to fault divorce, not elevated. The longer process for recovery
in torts than there should be for obtaining a divorce should provide
distance from the wrongful act, assuming legal doctrines such as res
judicata and collateral estoppel are not improperly used to prevent
bringing the tort after the divorce. 338 Moreover, the parties will have
333. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
334. See, e.g., Kristyn J. Krohse, Note, No Longer Following the Rule of Thumb—What To Do
with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 931.
335. All jurisdictions now recognize and adjudicate the tort of IIED. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS 1247 (2000).
336. For further discussion of what outrageous behavior would look like in the marital context,
see supra III.A.3.
337. Krause, supra note 4, at 1364.
338. See supra notes 222–237 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Dalton, supra note 221, at 386
(arguing that if abused spouses can escape procedural hurdles, “later is better”). Alternately, in a rare
case, a tort might be filed prior to divorce. Although statute of limitations problems could be addressed
through allowing continuous torts of domestic violence or abuse, see, for example, Giovine v. Giovine,
663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), a tort might be filed earlier than a divorce for strategic
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had recourse to the divorce process to separate from the marriage and
move on with their lives without an accusatory component. Indeed, as
indicated above, these torts should be much rarer than fault inquiries for
fault-driven or fault-regarding divorce. Yet the potential for such torts
and the availability of recourse apart from marriage is significant and
appropriate when the factual basis for a tort of IIED is present. 339
3. Spousal Torts Ignore the Complexity of Marital Relations
Queer theorists have argued that sexual aggression and sexual
deviance, such as encountered in the facts of Twyman, is overly
condemned due to undue hostility toward sex and sexual deviance as
well as the over-privileging of the social norms of monogamy. 340 It is
more accurate, according to Halley, to view the Twymans as willing
participants in the sexual deviance—it is Sheila Twyman’s role to be the
victim and the husband’s to be the dominator and both engage in such
domination willingly. 341 In other words, the sexual or even non-sexual
abuse is both desired by and abhorred by the victim reflecting the very
nature of the marital relationship such that punishing these complex
interactions is inappropriate, particularly in the marital framework where
a long-term structure for these interactions is in place.
Minimizing sexual and abusive harms by alleging enjoyment of the
abuse or equal power when engaging in it such that there is no one
victim, ignores how men and women indicate they have experienced
these harms. 342 Moreover, whatever enjoyment people are experiencing
from abusive subordinating relations, society has a right to protect its
citizens from abuse by discouraging it. 343 Abusive outrageous conduct
is harmful even in the context of a problematically co-dependent
relationship, as Halley describes, where both parties are active
participants.

reasons.
339. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the necessary factual claims for IIED.
340. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182,
193–98 (2003); Janet Halley et al., Gender Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 615–18 (2003).
341. Halley et al., supra note 340, at 615–18.
342. See, e.g., Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2006).
343. For instance, Michel Foucalt, upon whom Janet Halley relies in exploring queer theory, also
questions the advisability of perusing sexual abuse against children because in part a child may enjoy the
abuse. See MICHEL FOUCALT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE, INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
204–05 (1988). Regulations and torts that frown upon morally problematic abusive behavior are
justifiable on these grounds alone. See West, supra note 342.
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4. Spousal Torts are Prohibitively Costly
Others argue that separating torts from divorce is prohibitively
costly. 344 On the one hand, all litigation is costly and so bringing a
separate suit would logically increase costs. 345 On the other hand, if all
issues of blame and fault are removed from the divorce process and the
focus is only on devising a sustainable, fair, and appropriate custody and
financial settlement intended to optimize what is always a difficult
situation, divorce would include significantly less litigation, thereby
reducing its cost. Mediation, collaborative lawyering, negotiated
settlements, and family counseling would become even more central to
the process. 346 It is true that in a fault-driven or fault-regarding divorce
system, two suits would be costly and wasteful. But, the hope is that a
true no-fault divorce would be quicker and cheaper. Torts, on the other
hand, are full litigations with full costs, but they could be open to
contingency arrangements for those who could not otherwise afford to
bring such a suit. 347
IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis makes the case for the use of torts as opposed to the
divorce process to contend with marital wrongdoing. Indeed, fault
should be completely irrelevant in divorce and spousal torts a welldefined remedy in tort law. This analysis takes seriously the needs of
dependents and their caregivers who it is argued should be the central
concern of divorce law and who have the most to lose from the divorce
process. In fact, because spousal support should be based on needed
support for caretaking functions engaged in by primary caregivers, fault
should not be part of the support or property distribution formula. 348 In
addition, caregivers, who spend more time in the domestic sphere,
should receive the protection in torts that women do in the workplace
and as between strangers—a remedy for physical and severe emotional

344. See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269,
316 (1997); Evans, supra note 4, at 495–97.
345. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1498, 1532–33 (1993) (recognizing the practical limitations of tort suits to remedy situations of marital
abuse).
346. See supra Part II.B.2.
347. See Buel, supra note 201, at 951–53 (commenting that many attorneys falsely believe that
such suits are not worth bringing because defendant’s are likely to be lower income—but in fact
violence occurs among all financial strata at equal rates). But see Wilson, supra note 60, at 506 (arguing
that lawyers are unlikely to take marital torts on a contingency basis in most cases).
348. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 56–65.
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abuse. Torts present a powerful means of seeking redress while still
allowing those who need to escape the marriage because of serious
abuse to do so as quickly as possible. Only in rare, extraordinary, and
shocking circumstances should spousal wrongdoings affect post-divorce
lives of caregivers in need of financial support. In such cases of
physical and outrageous emotional abuse, financial ruin may befall the
perpetrator of the tort, but in such limited instances financial retribution
is just.
Moreover, extracting fault from divorce, yet preserving the relevance
of physical and emotional abuse in the context of torts, will preserve the
persistent experiential relevance of serious marital wrongdoing while
allowing the divorce process to be reparative and focus on the ongoing
relationships that are necessitated by children. It is true that such
spousal torts will be relatively rare and thus not release all the tension
between spouses. Yet, it is hoped that knowing that serious abuse torts
are available will have a reassuring effect on spouses in general.
Nonetheless, some tension would have to be appropriately healed not
through the law, but by time and other social resources not related to
litigation.
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